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Our society faces major challenges in numerous areas, including climate change
and healthcare. Addressing these problems with technological advances are of great
importance. Increasingly, however, consumers are resisting or rejecting such
technological interventions based on inappropriate assignment of risk. In other words, the
consumer assessment of risk is not in line with evidence-based assessment of risk. This
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article focuses on two controversial areas, vaccines and genetically engineered food, as
examples in which consumers assign a high risk despite an evidence-based assessment of
low risk. This article describes how empirically tested decision-making theories explain
why consumers inappropriately assign risk. While these prevailing theories and strategies
are meritorious, this article suggests that changes in modern day society need to be
considered as variables in how consumers assign risk. This is a tough problem to solve
and current risk communication strategies appear insufficient. This leads to the central
issue addressed in this article, which is that risk communication/policy implementation
needs to address emergent variables in modern society, including (1) rise of hyper
individualism, (2) role of the internet, and (3) economic interests. After discussing how
these variables likely apply to consumer risk assessment, this article proposes an
important new direction, both normatively and empirically, to highlight the problem and
analyze consumer decision-making.
INTRODUCTION
This article examines, critiques, and reconciles multiple decision-making theories as
they help us understand a disconnect between consumer perceptions of risk and evidencebased assessment of risk in biotechnology. It is not just that consumers do not behave as
expected by the incentives created by policies, which we already know is a problem. The
problem is two-fold: (1) people inappropriately assign risk regardless of the presentation
of evidence-based assessment of risk; and (2) people seek policies (and attendant behavior)
that support their assessment of risk, even when that assessment of risk is wrong. One
example of this is seen with vaccines. As it applies to the first fold, people decide not to
vaccinate even though the evidence-based assessment of risk supports vaccination. As it
applies to the second fold, people are seeking exemptions to vaccination laws. Another
example of this is seen with genetically engineered food (colloquially called ³GMOs´).
As it applies to the first fold, people believe that GMOs are unsafe, even though the
evidence-based assessment of risk establishes that GMOs are safe. As it applies to the
second fold, people seek labeling of foods and stricter regulation. This article seeks to
understand the influences that create these problems and proposes approaches to allow
consumers to appropriately assign risk as part of their decision-making processes.
Opponents to vaccines and GMOs utilize decision-making theories in a way that
does not allow consumers to appropriately assign risk. To date, experts agree on one
thing²we have not done enough to combat the spread of mis-information.1 Or, at least,
we have not reached consumers in a way that allows them to determine which information
is accurate and which information is not. This article suggests that simply providing correct
information is not enough. This issue is a tough problem to solve. This article suggests
what may be viewed as radical departures from the norm; the norm being that we provide
accurate information and hope that people make informed and rational decisions. This
article proposes that additional steps need to be taken, including, but not limited to,
exposing the entities that spread misinformation for what they are doing²they are
1. See, e.g., L.Z.G. Touyz, Genetically Modified Foods, Cancer, and Diet: Myths and Reality, 20 CURR.
ONCOL. e59, e59 (2013); Tara C. Smith, Vaccine Rejection and Hesitancy: A Review and Call to Action, 4 OPEN
F. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1, 1±2 (2017).
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manipulating the way we understand how people make decisions. In addition, accurate
information can be communicated in a way that recognizes how people make decisions.
This, in and of itself, is manipulative, to be sure, which is why it should be studied and
assessed before any implementation.
Decision-making is complicated and many theories exist to explain this complex
process. This article focuses on a specific set of theories that are discussed and utilized in
the legal literature. These are: (1) ambiguity aversion; (2) affect; (3) cultural cognition;
and (4) dual process/heuristics.2 This is not an exhaustive list and is not intended to
discount or ignore other decision-making theories. It is simply not possible to address
every decision-making theory, nor is it needed. To the extent that this article attempts to
reconcile how multiple decision-making theories can be applicable to addressing the
problem in which people inappropriately assign risk, the same tools can be used to extend
to and incorporate other theories as well. This article is a beginning, not an end. The
purpose is to launch a cohesive and collaborate platform that is subject to vetting, change,
and progress.
The decision-making theories addressed in this article have empirical support that
can be utilized in assessing how these theories are used to explain a disconnect between
consumer perceptions and evidence-based assessment of risk in certain policies. This
article discusses some current roadblocks, or at least heavy bumps in the road, that help
explain why people might inappropriately assign risk. These variables are (1) the rise of
individualism; (2) misinformation on the internet; and (3) economic forces seeking to
undermine the application of biotechnology. These variables demonstrate the problems
with decision-making. Or, perhaps, more accurately, support the large body of decisionmaking research that demonstrates that people do not behave rationally. The theories
discussed within this article are robust and can withstand the challenge of these variables.
The larger issue addressed in this article is how to address these variables in a way that
allows people to make decisions in which their assessment of risk is in line with evidencebased assessment of risk. This does not determine the actual decision that people will
make, for example, eat food from GMOs, but it allows them to appropriately assign risk
to food from GMOs (i.e., they are safe) when making food choices. With a correct
assessment of risk, the person may still choose to eat non-GMOs. In other words, this
article is concerned with risk assessment and perception, not necessarily the final decision.
While this article limits the discussion of controversial examples to vaccines and
GMOs, the concepts are applicable to other controversial areas such as dietary
supplements, fluoridated water, and other areas of scientific inquiry and exploration.
Something more is happening than mistrust of scientists or industry²something much
more fundamental is happening. This article seeks to explore a much more complicated
underbelly of this social phenomenon and attempts to expose and discuss a much more
complicated array of decision-making currents that ultimately need to be explicitly
2. Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643, 657 (1961); Paul Slovic,
What¶s Fear Got to Do With It? It¶s Affect We Need to Worry About, 69 MISS. L. REV. 971, 971 (2004); Dan M.
Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk, in HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY 726,
726±28 (S. Roeser et al. eds., 2012) [(hereinafter Kahan (2012)]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGEMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
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addressed.
Part I of this article describes four major decision-making theories: (1) ambiguity
aversion; (2) affect; (3) cultural cognition; and (4) dual process/heuristics. This section is
necessarily descriptive. A large body of research supports these theories²both
normatively and empirically. Part II highlights some tools for policy implementation that
recognize how people make decisions. These tools use tactics to push people to make the
decision that the policy seeks to accomplish. The examples discussed in this article are (1)
nudging; (2) public participation through notice and comment, and (3) risk communication
and risk perception. Part III describes two controversial areas of biotechnology, vaccines
and GMOs, as examples of how the decision-making theories help to explain why some
people inappropriately assign risk. These examples are chosen because both vaccines and
GMOs have an evidence-based assessment of low risk, but sectors of the public
inappropriately assign a high risk. Part IV describes how three important variables: rise of
individualism, misinformation on the internet, and economics, need to be considered as
disrupting the ability for people to make decisions in which they appropriately assign risk.
This article addresses how these variables actually speak to the very way that people make
decisions and manipulate people into inappropriately assigning risk. This article concludes
with thoughts about how to apply what we know from decision-making theories and risk
perception to provide information in a way that allows people to make an assessment of
risk that is in line with evidence-based assessment of risk.
I. DECISION-MAKING THEORIES
By decision-making theories, this article refers to thinking processes that impact risk
perception.3 This is distinct from motivations or challenging so-called rational norms.
While numerous thinking theories exist, this article focuses on a subset that either are
regularly referred to in the legal literature, discussed in the social science literature with
reference to policy, or both. With these criteria, this article focuses on ambiguity, affect,
cultural cognition, dual process/availability heuristics²all of which are empirically tested
to impact risk perception. Of note, these theories will be discussed separately from tools
for policy implementation, infra Part II, such as nudging and risk communication. This
section is necessarily descriptive of the theories; an application of these theories to
vaccines and GMOs will be discussed in Part III.
A. Ambiguity Aversion
Daniel Ellsberg¶s seminal work on ambiguity aversion provides insights that people
prefer options with known risks even if another option exists that is likely less risky, but
the subject is not familiar with the unknown risk.4 In his work, Ellsberg demonstrated that
3. Decision-making is complicated. Some theories address motivations, while other theories help us
understand the thinking process especially as it relates to risk assessments. See, e.g., How we change what others
think,
feel,
believe,
and
do,
CHANGING
MINDS
(last
visited
Jan.
22,
2020),
http://changingminds.org/explanations/theories/a_decision.htm (listing and linking to a variety of decisionmaking theories and separating them into different categories).
4. Ellsberg, supra note 2, at 657 (³Responses from confessed violators indicate that the difference is not to
be found in terms of the two factors commonly used to determine a choice situation, the relative desirability of
the possible pay-offs and the relative likelihood of the events affecting them, but a third dimension of the problem
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given a choice between betting on an urn with a known ratio of red and black marbles
compared to betting on an urn with an unknown ratio, subjects preferred to bet on the urn
with the known ratio.5 Additional work elucidated this theory and helped us to understand
how ambiguity aversion underscores a person¶s perception of risk.6 The underlying
thinking process is that a person has a hard time assigning risk when an unknown variable
is presented, thus they revert to a known risk, even if that risk is higher.
Later studies demonstrate that ambiguity aversion underscores additional risk
perception problems. When people are presented with ambiguous information, they have
trouble sorting through the likely risk assessment and are inclined to assign a high risk and
low benefit, even in the face of evidence that the risk is low and the benefit is high. 7 A
salient example, discussed further below, is vaccine hesitant parents (³VHPs´).8 When
presented with information regarding risks from vaccines, even if the risk is not evidencebased (e.g., link to autism) and also with information that no risk of autism exists, the
parent may assign a high risk and decide not to vaccinate. The information about a link of
vaccines with autism clearly comes from an unreliable source, but the parent is unable to
discount that information. They receive ambiguous information, believe that their child is
at a possible future risk for autism, and decide not to vaccinate. The parent has
inappropriately assigned a high risk to a side effect that does not even exist and assigned
a low benefit to the prevention of the vaccine preventable disease, e.g., measles. 9 This

of choice: the nature of one¶s information concerning the relative likelihood of events. What is at issue might be
called the ambiguity of this information, a quality depending on the amount, type, reliability, and µunanimity¶ of
information, and giving rise to one¶s degree of µconfidence¶ in an estimate of relative likelihoods.´).
5. Ambiguity aversion helps us understand why people will choose the option with a known higher risk,
even if the other option likely has a lower risk. It is the unknown that creates the aversion, even when the unknown
is likely less risky. Id. at 656.
6. Id. at 658±62, 666 (³In contrast, the ambiguities surrounding the outcome of a proposed innovation, a
departure from current strategy, may be more noticeable. Different sorts of events are relevant to its outcome,
and their likelihoods must now be estimated, often with little evidence or prior expertise; and the effect of a given
state of nature upon the outcome of the new action may itself be in question. Its variance may not appear any
higher than that of the familiar action when computed on the basis of µbest estimates¶ of the probabilities
involved, yet the meaningfulness of this calculation may be subject to doubt. The decision rule discussed will
not preclude choosing such an act, but it will definitely bias the choice away from such ambiguous ventures and
toward the strategy with µknown risks.¶´); Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling
Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325, 333±41 (1992) (describing empirical
studies of ambiguity). One study provided scenarios in which a new form of technology, likely with a lower risk,
was provided as an option compared to a known, likely higher, risk. Participants who indicated aversion to
ambiguous information as assessed by their responses to predictor questions also demonstrated an aversion to
choosing a new technology, even if the risk was communicated as lower. Joanna K. Sax & Neal Doran, Ambiguity
and Consumer Perceptions of Risk in Various Areas of Biotechnology, 42 J. CONSUM. POL¶Y 47, 54±56 (2019)
[hereinafter Sax & Doran (2019)].
7. See Camerer & Weber, supra note 6, at 325±33 (discussing modeling uncertainty and ambiguity); Sax &
Doran (2019), supra note 6, at 55±57 (³As hypothesized, we found that participants who showed an initial
aversion to ambiguous information were significantly more likely to choose the response options that indicated
a high assessment of risk, even when alternative choices had a high benefit or a likelihood of low risk.´).
8. Laura L. Blaisdell, Caitlin Gutheil, Norbert A. M. Hootsmans & Paul K. J. Han, Unknown Risks: Parental
Hesitation about Vaccination, 36 MED. DECISION MAKING 479, 480 (2016) (³Whether perceptions of and
aversion to ambiguity might play a role in vaccine hesitancy is an important question given the vast amount of
vaccine-related information to which parents are exposed and which is often incomplete, conflicting, and
changing.´).
9. See id. at 482 (³Parents in the groups also minimized the subjective risk of harms from [vaccine
preventable diseases] by citing various factors that they believed reduced these risks.´).
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assignment of high risk and low benefit is completely at odds with the scientific
assessment²which is low risk and high benefit for vaccines.
In sum, ambiguity aversion helps explain how a person makes a decision to assign a
high risk when they receive competing information.10 The aversion to the ambiguous
information means that they will assign a high risk even if some of the information
presented establishes an evidence-based low risk. Any information that creates ambiguity,
even if it is a small amount of information, impacts how the person perceives risk.
B. Affect Heuristics
Paul Slovic¶s work on the decision-making theory called affect heuristics helps us
to understand how a faint whisper of emotion underscores a person¶s perception of risk.11
For example, the feeling of dread associated with the consequences of the malfunction of
a nuclear power plant underscores a person¶s assessment that nuclear power is high risk
and low benefit.12 However, risk assessment supports that nuclear power is clean and safe,
or, in risk perception terms, nuclear power is low risk and high benefit13 The probability
of a meltdown of a nuclear power plant is extremely low. The risks from regular use of
coal energy are high. But, the mental visual of people melting or dying of cancer from a
nuclear power plant breakdown is simply too much emotion for people to decide that
nuclear power is low risk and high benefit.14 This is compounded, of course, by actual
meltdowns of nuclear power plants such as Chernobyl and Fukushima. 15
Work by Slovic and others demonstrates that negative words or feelings impact

10. Ellsberg, supra note 2, at 657.
11. Paul Slovic & Ellen Peters, Risk Perception and Affect, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 322,
322 (2006) (comparing strong emotions, such as fear and anger, with subtler feelings: ³Fortunately, most of the
time people are in a calmer state, being guided by much subtler feelings. We shall focus this review on a µfaint
whisper of emotion¶ called affect. We use the term affect to mean the specific quality of µgoodness¶ or µbadness¶
(a) experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and (b) demarcating a positive or negative
quality of a stimulus. We have used the term µthe affect heuristic¶ to characterize reliance on such feelings.´);
Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, The Affect Heuristic, 177 EUR. J.
OPERATIONAL RES. 1333, 1333±35 (2007).
12. Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCI. 280, 285 (1987) [hereinafter Slovic (1987)]; Slovic & Peters,
supra note 11, at 322±23 (³Those studies showed that feelings of dread were the major determiner of public
perception and acceptance of risk for a wide range of hazards. This explained, for example, why the public judges
radiation exposure from nuclear power plants (highly dreaded) as far riskier than radiation from medical Xrays²an assessment not shared by risk experts. In today¶s world, terrorism has replaced nuclear power at the top
of the list of widely dreaded risks.´); see also Joanna K. Sax, Biotechnology and Consumer Decision-Making 47
SETON HALL L. REV. 433, 437 fn. 6 (2017) [hereinafter Sax (2017)]; Slovic, supra note 2, at 977±78.
13. Slovic (1987), supra note 12, at 281; see also Michael Siegrist & Bernadette Sutterlin, Human and
Nature-Caused Hazards: The Affect Heuristic Causes Biased Decisions, 34 RISK ANALYSIS 1482, 1482±92
(2014) (comparing participants¶ assessment of risk in human-made and natural disasters, using nuclear power as
an example of human-made hazard).
14. See Slovic & Peters, supra note 11, at 322 (³fear amplifies risk estimates´); Slovic (1987), supra note 12,
at 283, 285 (³Factor 1, labeled µdread risk¶ is defined at its high (right-hand) end by perceived lack of control,
dread, catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and benefits. Nuclear
weapons and nuclear power score highest on the characteristics that make up this factor.´); Siegrist & Sutterlin,
supra note 13, at 1483, 1488±89.
15. Interestingly, the accident at Three Mile Island, another example of a problem at a nuclear power plant,
did not result in a single direct fatality or a higher percentage of latent cancer fatalities, but the accident itself
caused serious externalities in perceptions of risk. Slovic (1987), supra note 12, at 283.
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consumer risk assessment.16 If consumers feel that the use of a new technology may cause
cancer, such as the misinformation provided about eating food from GMOs, then the
person rejects such technology and assigns a high risk and low benefit. The feeling or
affect overwhelms the ability to accept the evidence-based assessment of low risk and high
benefit.17 Not surprisingly, those skilled in marketing take advantage of the affect heuristic
to sway consumer confidence.
Positive feelings also impact consumer decision-making.18 If home shoppers see a
home that makes them feel positive, they might be more likely to buy it. Furthermore,
consumers want to re-experience positive feelings. So, when shopping for clothes or other
items, a positive feeling might sway consumers to make purchases. These positive feelings
also underscore consumer risk perception. If consumers have a positive affect, they tend
to assign a low risk and high benefit, regardless of evidence-based risk assessment.19
Additional studies utilize the theory of affect heuristics to understand implicit
assessments.20 In these studies, subjects are asked how they associate positive or negative
words with a particular subject.21 The positive or negative associations demonstrate
underlying or implicit responses even when an explicit response might be different. For
example, a subject may think they are ³woke´ and would not discriminate, but their
implicit assessment suggests otherwise. This important work demonstrates that we can
socialize people to make non-discriminatory choices, even if they have implicit negative
associations.
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, Paul Slovic and others, collaborate with other
scholars to harmonize or suggest ways in which the affect heuristic and other decisionmaking theories are at play in consumer responses to policy and to policy decisions in and

16. See Ellen Peters, Daniel Vastfjall, Tommy Garling & Paul Slovic, Affect and Decision Making: A ³Hot´
Topic, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 79, 81±82 (2006) [hereinafter Peters (2006)].
17. Slovic & Peters, supra note 11, at 323 (describing work by Alhakami and Slovic in which they found an
inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit, in other words, that people assign a low benefit
to a perceived high risk. ³This finding implies that people judge a risk not only by what they think about it but
also by how they feel about it. If their feelings toward an activity are favorable, they tend to judge the risks as
low and the benefits as high; if their feelings toward the activity are unfavorable, they tend to make the opposite
judgment-high risk and low benefit (i.e. the affect heuristic [internal citation omitted].´).
18. Peters (2006), supra note 16, at 80 (³First, affect can act as information: at the moment of judgment or
choice, decision makers consult their feelings about a choice and ask, µHow do I feel about this?¶The feelings
act as information to guide the judgment or decision processes.´ [internal citations omitted]); Slovic & Peters,
supra note 11, at 322 (³Pleasant feelings motivate actions that people anticipate will reproduce those feelings.
Unpleasant feelings motivate actions that people anticipate will avoid those feelings.´).
19. Peters (2006), supra note 16, at 82 (³In four studies, [Caruso and Shafir] show that thoughts about mood,
regardless of its valence, increases choices of alternatives that promote a good mood, even if those options would
have been rejected otherwise (when not thinking about mood).´).
20. Michael Siegrist, Carmen Keller & Marie-Eve Cousin, Implicit Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power and
Mobile Phone Base Stations: Support for the Affect Heuristic, 26 RISK ANALYSIS 1021, 1023±25 (2006)
(studying implicit attitudes toward nuclear power).
21. See, e.g., Michael Siegrist, Carmen Keller & Marie-Eve Cousin, Implicit Attitudes Toward Nuclear
Power and Mobile Phone Base Stations: Support for the Affect Heuristic, 26 RISK ANALYSIS 1021, 1023±25
(2006) (assessing whether ³negative attributes are more strongly associated with nuclear power and that positive
attributes are more strongly associated with hydroelectric power.´); see also Alexa Spence & Ellen Townsend,
Implicit Attitudes towards Genetically Modified (GM) Foods: A Comparison of Context-Free and ContextDependent Evaluations, 46 APPETITE 67, 67 (2006) (using the Go No-Go task to investigate explicit and implicit
attitudes toward foods from GMOs).
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of themselves.22 This underscores an important point of this article, which is that multiple
decision-making processes are at work at the same time²even the experts know this.
Allowing consumers to appropriately assign risk requires a holistic approach to addressing
consumer decision-making.
C. Cultural Cognition
Cultural cognition, with a large amount of work led by Dan Kahan, theorizes that
group values impacts risk perception.23 Put differently, the cultural outlook of a group,
including the culture¶s world view, impacts the risk perception of the individuals within
that group.24 Cultural theory, the underlying theoretical framework posits two basic
claims: (1) if a participant in a group engages in conduct that is perceived as a harm to the
collective group, that participant will face censure or blame, and (2) participants in a group
perceive risk in a way that advances the way of life to which they participate.25
The cultures to which cultural cognition refer to are not the layman cultures, such as
European, Korean, Jewish, etc. Rather, they group or grid based on philosophical
categories, such as individualism, hierarchy, communitarianism, and egalitarianism.26
This allows researchers to test the role of philosophy/culture as groups, instead of
demographic factions. Although, admittedly, a demographic characteristic may place a
person in one cultural group. Put differently, white males may be more individualistic
given their place in history.27 Kahan and others recognize that individuals may associate
with one or more categories, but that the individual¶s perceptions of risk would associate
closely with the group to which they most closely identify.28 A simplified example is a
22. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 137±45 (2011) [hereinafter Kahneman (2011)] (³Paul
Slovic probably knows more about the peculiarities of human judgment of risk than any other individual. His
work offers a picture of Mr. and Ms. Citizen that is far from flattering: guided by emotion rather than by reason,
easily swayed by trivial details, and inadequately sensitive to differences between low and negligibly low
probabilities.´).
23. Dan Kahan attributes that cultural cognition is a variety of interpreting the work of cultural theory of risk
as was set forth by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 726±28 (³This entry
examines two related frameworks for the study of popular risk perceptions: the cultural theory of risk, associated
with the work of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982); and the cultural cognition of risk, a focus of recent work by
various researchers including myself.´).
24. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 727 (explaining the grid/group scheme that predicts how an individual¶s
perception of risk that reflects and reinforces their cultural way of life).
25. Id. at 728 (³The cultural theory of risk makes two basic claims about the relationship between cultural
³ways of life´ so defined and risk perceptions. The first is that discrete constellations of perceived risk tend to
cohere better with one or another way of life. Forms of conduct understood to inflict collective harm invite
restriction, and the people who engage in such behavior censure and blame (Douglas 1992). [. . .] The second
claim of cultural theory is that individuals gravitate toward perceptions of risk that advance the way of life to
which they are committed.´); MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE
SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 1, 8 (Univ. Cal. Press 1982) (³Risk taking and
risk aversion, shared confidence and shared fears, are part of the dialogue on how best to organize social
relations.´).
26. Id. at 727 fig.28.1 (showing the group-grid scheme); id. at 731 fig.28.3 (showing scales).
27. Id. at 741. Kahan explains the ³white male effect´ by suggesting (maybe concluding) that this can be
understood by placing the white males on the scale to explain the underlying reason why white males might be
grouped together by their risk perception.
28. Id. at 734±35 (³A certain measure of heterogeneity among individuals is perfectly consistent with there
being aggregations of persons who exert a dominant influence on social structures and affiliated worldviews
(Braman et al. eds., 2005). Under either of these conditions, we would expect individuals to form packages of
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participant¶s perception of climate change: a communitarianism-oriented participant might
support combatting climate change because of the effect on the group and future
generations whereas a participant associated with individualism might oppose combatting
climate change because it impacts their business with additional regulatory compliance.
Underscoring this is that each participant¶s association with their culture demonstrates
their perception of the risk of climate change. Empirical studies testing cultural cognition
place participants on a ³group-grid´ scheme and reliably predict the respondents¶
perception of risk.29
Notably, Dan Kahan collaborates closely with Paul Slovic (discussed above as the
pioneer of the affect heuristic), which allows cross-pollination discussion and testing of
the interplay of multiple decision-making theories. Kahan recognizes that the
psychological concepts and cultural associations are mechanisms that can both exist at the
same time.30
Interestingly, Kahan and colleagues found that even when subjects were not familiar
with a specific technology, such as nanotechnology, they still assessed or assigned risk in
a way that broke them into their cultural groups.31 This could suggest that risk perception
is based on cultural identity either much more so or exclusive of familiarity. Or, as Kahan
suggests, that those with more individualistic groupings are more likely to learn about
nanotechnology and then see it as low risk.32 And, this cultural grouping explains why
they become familiar with the technology and then are able to assign a low risk.
Work by Kahan and others suggests that simply providing people with information
will not change their risk assessment. To do so, information must be provided in a way
that affirms their cultural identities, only then can the subjects have a better chance of
appropriately assigning risk.33 In other words, opposing groups can come to the same
conclusion depending on how the information is presented.34 In this way, risk perception

risk perceptions characteristic of their groups in proportion to the strength or degree of the attachment to the
cultural groups with whom they are most closely affiliated (cf. Manton et al. 1992). That¶s basically what our
measures are designed to show.´).
29. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 740 fig.28.8 (showing that perceived risks are correlated with world
views).
30. Id. at 739 (³Whether or not viewed as faithful to Douglas¶s vision, studies using psychometric concepts
and methods have identified a variety of discrete mechanisms of cultural cognition.´); See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan,
Donald Braman, Paul Slovic, John Gastil & Geoffrey Cohen, Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of
Nanotechnology, 4 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 87, 89 (2008) [hereinafter Kahan et al. (2008)] (³Social
psychology is making important advances in identifying techniques for framing information on controversial
policy issues in a manner that makes it possible for people of diverse values to derive the same factual information
from it.´).
31. Kahan et al. (2008), supra note 30, at 87 (³Holding cultural-worldviews constant (at the sample mean),
information exposure does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that either a subject who is relatively
unfamiliar with nanotechnology or one who is relatively familiar with it will perceive the benefits of
nanotechnology to be greater than its risks.´).
32. Id. at 88 (³The second finding sheds some light on what the influence²or set of influences²might be.
Regressing self-reported familiarity with nanotechnology on various individual characteristics revealed that
being simultaneously hierarchical and individualistic predicted greater familiarity with nanotechnology.´).
33. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 753 (³Cultural-identity affirmation hypothesizes that you can get the same
effect when you communicate information about risk in a way that affirms rather than threatens their cultural
worldview.´).
34. Id. (describing an experiment in which subjects were presented with information about global warming
that threatened or affirmed their world view and found ³biased assimilation with a vengeance.´).
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can be aligned with evidence-based risk assessment even if participants lean towards one
cultural group versus another.
D. Heuristics and Dual Process Theory
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman¶s important work on decision-making is
ground-breaking.35 While an enormous body of literature surrounds their work, this article
seeks to simplify their work in an effort to make it digestible. Their work can be broken
down into two related categories: heuristics and dual process.36 These categories help to
explain each other.
The first category addresses preferences as signals of risk aversion and is known as
heuristics. This theory provides that people rely on heuristics principles to simplify
assessing probabilities, but that sometimes these heuristics lead to errors. 37 Underscoring
this theory are biases that impact decision-making discussed in turn below.
The first bias is Representativeness.38 In this bias, people associate certain
characteristics with a particular class.39 For example, if a person is described as shy,
withdrawn, and very helpful, and then people are asked to choose from a likely occupation
that the person is a librarian or physician, people are likely to associate the person as being
a librarian.40 This is true, even though there are many more physicians than librarians, but
people do not consider such an important factor in their assessment. 41 In other tested
scenarios, Tversky and Kahneman note that other probabilities, such as sample size,
misconceptions of chance, and predictability, are also ignored in this bias.42
The second bias is Availability.43 In this bias, people are influenced by the ease with

35. See generally Kahneman (2011), supra note 22 (book summarizing Kahneman¶s contributions to this
field).
36. Id. at 8 (describing a publication in Science that provided research based on years of collaboration and
experimentation: ³It described the simplifying shortcuts of intuitive thinking and explained some 20 biases as
manifestations of these heuristics ± and also as demonstrations of the role of heuristics in judgment.´).
37. Tversky and Kahneman, supra note 2, at 3 (³This article shows that people rely on a limited number of
heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler
judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and
systematic errors.´).
38. Id. at 4 (Representativeness refers to when ³probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A is
representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A resembles B.´).
39. Id. (providing an example in which a person is described as follows: ³Steve is very shy and withdrawn,
invariably helpful, but with little interest in people, or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a need
for order and structure, and a passion for detail.´Participants are then asked the probability that Steve is engaged
in a particular profession by choosing from a list of professions. Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated that people
order the likelihood of a particular profession by the degree to which Steve represents a typical person in that
profession.).
40. Id. (describing Steve, as noted in the previous footnote, and learning that people think Steve is a librarian).
41. Id. (³This approach to the judgment of probability leads to serious errors, because similarity, or
representativeness, is not influenced by several factors that should affect judgments of probability.´).
42. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 2, at 4±11 (describing insensitivities, misconceptions, and illusions
that contribute to the representativeness bias).
43. Id. at 11 (³Availability is a useful clue for assessing frequency or probability, because instances of large
classes are usually reached better and faster than instances of less frequent classes. However, availability is
affected by factors other than frequency and probability. Consequently, the reliance on availability leads to
predictable biases, some of which are illustrated below.´).
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which the frequency or probability of an event can be brought to their mind.44 In their
work, Tversky and Kahneman use the example that a person may assess the risk of a heart
attack in a middle-aged person by calling to the front of their mind whether any of their
middle-aged acquaintances have had heart attacks.45 But, as Tversky and Kahneman note,
this decision-making process leads to biases.46 These biases can be based on the ability to
retrieve information, which leads to probability or frequency biases. 47 Other deficiencies
include the effectiveness of a search set, the ability to construct probabilities, and pairing
events that are not necessarily correlated.48
The third bias is Adjustment and Anchoring.49 In this bias, people start with an initial
value and then adjust.50 This is problematic if either the initial value or the adjustment is
incorrect.51 People can be given different initial values, but if they make the same
adjustment, they will conclude different results. Other problems with this bias include
difficulty evaluating conjunctive and disjunctive events and subjective probability
distribution.52
In sum, this category/theory is concerned with cognitive biases that impact the
heuristic to which people rely on to make decisions and perceive risk. 53 In other words,
subjective probability is different than actual probability. People do this without realizing
it and begs the larger question as to whether these heuristics can be overcome to allow
people to make risk assessments that are in line with evidence-based risk assessments.
The second category, Dual Process theory, addresses the distinction between
thinking fast and slow or, in other words, the subconscious versus the conscious.54 Daniel

44. Id. (³There are situations in which people assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event
but the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind.´).
45. Id. (³For example, one may assess the risk of heart attack among middle-aged people by recalling such
occurrences among one¶s acquaintances.´).
46. Id. at 11±14.
47. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 2, at 11 (providing a good example: ³It is a common experience that
the subjective probability of traffic accidents rises temporarily when one sees a car overturned by the side of the
road.´).
48. Id. at 12±14 (describing how other biases lead to systematic errors).
49. Id. at 14 (³in many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to
yield the final answer. The initial value, or starting point, may be suggested by the formulation of the problem,
or it may be the result of partial computation. In either case, adjustments are typically insufficient (Slovic &
Lichtenstein, 1971). That is, different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial
values. We call this phenomenon anchoring.´).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 2, at 14±18 (discussing the problems, including biases, in anchoring
and adjustment).
53. Id. at 18±20 (³This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgments under
uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge probability that an
object or event A belongs to class or process B, (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed
when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development, and (iii)
adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available.
These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors.
A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgments and
decisions in situations of uncertainty.´).
54. Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 20±21 (³System 1 operated automatically and quickly, with little or
no effort and no sense of voluntary control. System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that
demand it, including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective
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Kahneman describes this theory as what happens when someone compares facial
recognition, which is usually done quickly, with multiplying multi-digit numbers, which
usually requires effort.55 Of course, the more a person must slow down to think about
something, the more effort that must be dedicated to such a decision. The quick thinking,
or in this example facial recognition, is referred to as system 1.56 The slow thinking, or
this example multiplying multi-digit numbers, is referred to as system 2.57
The limitations of the fast thinking (system 1) are that a person utilizes what they
can quickly recall without the time or effort to obtain additional information.58 Kahneman
refers to this as natural intuition, which serves humans well at least in some
circumstances.59 But, intuition leads to mistakes.60 This is not necessarily distinct from
the biases discussed under Heuristics, described above, since these biases are the bases of
quick thinking.61
The slow thinking (system 2) is what we generally refer to as analytical and
logical.62 Some describe this slower thinking as based on algorithms, for example, which
allow multiple inputs, control for variables, and then reasoned probabilities. 63 But, biases
can still underscore assumptions which create the very algorithms to which the slow
thinking person relies on, even if the bias is unconscious. 64 Nevertheless, even if biases
are present in both fast and slow thinking, dual process theory still has legs because other
parts of the cognitive process are different. The slower thinking process is thought to have
procedures to override the subconscious mind that is driving the fast thinking.65
At issue in the dual process theory is how people learn to think slow.66 Is it through
age? Is it through education? Is it though experience? Is it from an internal mechanism? Is
it from an external mechanism? Can people be taught to think consciously? Pierre Noel

experience of agency, choice, and concentration.´).
55. Id. at 19±20.
56. Id. at 20±21.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 25 (³The division of labor between System 1 and System 2 is highly efficient: it minimizes effort
and optimizes performance. The arrangement works well most of the time because System 1 is generally very
good at what it does: its models of familiar situations are accurate, its short-term predictions are usually accurate
as well, and its initial reactions to challenges are swift and generally appropriate. System 1 has biases, however,
systematic errors that it is prone to make in specified circumstances.´).
59. Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 25±30.
60. Id.
61. Pierre Noel Barrouillet, Dual-Process Theories and Cognitive Development: Advances and Challenges,
31 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 79, 79±80 (2011) (³The famous studies by Kahneman and Tversky on judgment and
decision making (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982) completed the portrait of reasoning driven by a set of
heuristics that departs from any logic or normative theory. Overall, the so-called µheuristics and biases¶ literature
deeply disconfirmed the presumed rationality of adult human beings.´).
62. Barrouillet, supra note 61, at 80 (³Inherently deliberative, conscious, controlled, slow, and demanding in
working memory resources, this second type of processing or system is probably unique to humans and assumed
to underpin analytical, logical reasoning and normative responses.´).
63. Id. at 81±84 (describing studies addressing dual process thinking); Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at
29±30.
64. Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 109±18 (describing how the law of small numbers can create a bias
in system 1, and even system 2, thinking).
65. Barrouillet, supra note 61, at 81 (describing the work of Jonathan Evan¶s work regarding dual process
thinking).
66. Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 354±62.
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Barrouillet, in a discussion of the facets of dual process theory, raises the variable that
biases perhaps increase with age along with experience, and thus even though we expect
adults to have more of a handle on slow thinking, it is possible that reliance on intuition
can increase with age.67 This query is spurred by the work of Reyna and Brainerd, which
refers to this as the fuzzy-trace theory.68
In sum, both heuristics and dual process theory differentiate between intuition or
sub-conscious decisions with deliberate or conscious decisions. Scholarship in this area
acknowledges that biases and heuristics cannot be divorced from these thinking processes
and might even be layered into them.69 Some may question whether the slow and
deliberative thinking necessarily leads to better decisions, which for the purposes of this
paper, refers to decisions that appropriately assign risk.70
E. The Problem with Decision-Making
All of these theories are empirically tested and so there is no reason to reject that
they help us to understand how people make decisions. The problem is that they can be in
conflict and lead to different results, which begs the question about which theory may
explain a particular decision at a given time. For example, a vaccine hesitant parent (VHP)
may decide not to vaccinate, but at the same time may be concerned about climate change
and make decisions for the good of the community. These are inconsistent results if only
explained by the cultural cognition theory. The cultural cognition theory likely predicts
that someone who trends towards egalitarianism on climate change (i.e., good for the
community) would similarly decide the same way about long-standing vaccines²also a
community-oriented position.71 Cultural cognition, as valid and compelling as it is, is not
the only explanation for decision-making.
One concern about decision-making is that the strength of the processes underlying
any decision is not static. At times, affect may be the prevailing thinking process which
could conflict with how the person would make the decision if cultural cognition was the
only thinking process at play. Perhaps this is not a controversial idea; certainly none of the
proponents of each theory propose that their theory is the only theory. But, it begs the
question of how to know which theory (or theories) are most likely dominating for any
particular decision²especially when the person inappropriately assigns risk²so that
policies can be communicated to that person in such a way that they can appropriately
assign risk.
Another problem, perhaps, is how changes in society impact how people make
67. Barrouillet, supra note 61, at 83±84.
68. Id. at 84 (³As all the other dual-process theories, the fuzzy-trace theory distinguishes between analytical
thinking, which is slow and conscious, and intuition that operates quickly, out of consciousness.´).
69. Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 109±95 (discussing how bias and heuristics explain system 1 and
system 2 thinking).
70. An example is the Invisible Gorilla experiment in which participants are engaged in an engrossing task
and may not see the person wearing the gorilla suit enter the picture. Daniel Kahneman, Of 2 Minds: How Fast
and Slow Thinking Shape Perception and Choice [Excerpt], SCI. AM., (June 15, 2012),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/kahneman-excerpt-thinking-fast-and-slow/.
71. It is possible that a vaccine made from new technology might be seen as riskier by the communitarianegalitarianism group-grid. Work by Kahan suggests that this group-grid might be more risk adverse. Kahan
(2012), supra note 2, at 740 fig.28.8.
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decisions, if at all. How, for example, does the internet impact how we assess these
theories, at least with respect to a variable within an empirical study? Are VHPs finding a
community of other VHPs on-line? Research already demonstrates that those that group
towards communitarianism already perceive technology as more-risky and now they can
find a group with like-minded perceptions.72 Or, is it receipt of information online leading
to fear of vaccination leading to life-long debilitating side effects (for which there is zero
evidence) that impacts the decisions made by VHPs?
Over the past seventy years, our society has moved towards an individualistic
society.73 How does the movement towards individualism impact decision-making? In the
1950s, for example, people lived in smaller communities and had some stake in their
communities.74 This, of course, had all sorts of externalities by promoting racism and
bigotry, for example, and with the change towards expressing feelings and individualism,
we moved away from racism (sort of), but an entirely new set of problems arose.75 Perhaps
we moved too far away from community and a person¶s perception of their place in a
larger community may be distorted.76 This begs the question as to how the prevailing
decision-making theories can incorporate this. Most likely, they can.
In addition, well-funded groups create confusion in the marketplace.77 A large antiGMO campaign, for example, undoubtedly contributes to the inappropriate assignment of
risk to this technology. These anti-GMO groups provide misinformation in a way that
exploits how people make decisions, using fear, for example.78
These variables: (1) individualism, (2) internet, and (3) economics, provide factors
that impact the way people make decisions as it relates to risk perception. A further
discussion of this problem, along with suggestions to address the problem, is the subject
of Part IV. Before that discussion, this article acknowledges that strategies exist to
implement policies that seek to align the public¶s perception of risk with evidence-based
assessment of risk.
72. Id. at 744 (discussing how participants respond to information about a new technology in a ³biased
manner supportive of a predisposition toward risk.´).
73. See DAVID BROOKS, THE SECOND MOUNTAIN 6±20 (2019).
74. Id. at 4±7.
75. Id. at 6 (describing a city as a ³collection of villages´ but also admitting that ³this culture had failings,
which ultimately made it intolerable. This moral ecology tolerated a lot of racism and anti-Semitism. Housewives
felt trapped and stifled, and professional women faced daunting barriers. In 1963, Betty Friedman described a
problem that had no name, which was the flattening, crushing boredom of many female lives. The culture had an
emotionally cold definition of masculinity; men had trouble expressing love for their wives and children. The
food was really boring. People felt imprisoned by the pressure of group conformity and tortured by the intolerant
tyranny of local opinion. Many played out their assigned social roles, but they were dead inside.´).
76. Id. at 18 (discussing the problem of the Instagram life and stating: ³The problem is that the person in the
aesthetic phase sees life as possibilities to be experienced and not projects to be fulfilled or ideals to be lived out.
He will hover above everything but never land. In the aesthetic way of life, each individual day is fun, but it
doesn¶t seem to add up to anything.´).
77. See, e.g., U.S. RIGHT TO KNOW, (last visited Jan. 22, 2020), https://usrtk.org/ (a well-funded anti-GMO
group); see also, Alex Berezow & Gary Ruskin, GMO Labeling Movement Funded by Anti-Vaxxers, AM.
COUNCIL ON SCI. & HEALTH, (May 8, 2017), https://www.acsh.org/news/2017/05/08/gary-ruskin-gmo-labelingmovement-funded-anti-vaxxers-11245.
78. MARK LYNAS, SEEDS OF SCIENCE 140±44 (2018) (describing how anti-GMO activists make claims about
the side effects of eating GMOs, including, for example, that children will be born with the head of a corn plant).
Although, admittedly, the manufacturers of GMO seeds, such as Monsanto, are also well-funded. But, Monsanto
does not appear to be able to manipulate consumers into choosing foods from GMOs.
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II. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The following highlights tools used for policy implementation in which the purpose
is for the consumer to make a decision in line with expert analysis of risk. These tools are
designed to change behavior, although they do so in different ways. Although numerous
tools exist, this article focuses on those that interact with decision-making theories. Below
is a descriptive narrative with a discussion in Part IV regarding how these tools adequately
or inadequately accomplish their goals in light of decision-making, particularly in the area
of emerging biotechnology. The three main tools discussed include nudging, risk
communication and risk perception (Risk Hybrid), and public participation through notice
and comment.
A. Nudging
Nudging is defined as ³liberty-preserving approaches that steer people in particular
directions, but that also allow them to go their own way.´79 An example of nudging is
automatic enrollment in a retirement plan²this ³nudges´ a person to save for retirement,
but the person can also opt out.80 The person is not required to save for retirement, but the
auto enrollment steers the person to do so. The hallmark of nudging is that it allows the
person freedom of choice and transparency with generally low (or no) cost.81 This makes
nudging distinct from rules or government decisions that are coercive or hidden from
public scrutiny.82
Importantly, effective nudges need to be based on evidence. 83 Effective nudges are
those that understand how people will respond, or in other words, how people will make
decisions. In his work, Cass Sunstein describes ten important mechanisms of nudges: (1)
default rules (e.g., auto-enrollment in retirement plan); (2) simplification (e.g., easy to
navigate); (3) uses of social norms (e.g., behave this way because most others do); (4)
increase in ease and convenience (e.g., healthy food options most visible); (5) disclosure
(e.g., environmental harm with dirty energy use); (6) warnings (e.g., cigarette labels); (7)
precommitment strategies (e.g., committing to a future action such as smoking cessation);
(8) reminders (e.g., text message reminder); (9) eliciting implementation intentions (e.g.,
will you vaccinate your child?); and (10) informing people of the nature and consequences
of their own past choices (e.g., how much they spent on electricity last year). 84
The problem with nudging is that it assumes people will respond appropriately to
the nudge. Of course, Cass Sunstein and others acknowledge that nudges need to be
empirically tested, and it is possible that a particular nudge does not create the result
intended.85 If that is the case, then the nudge needs to be changed. This provides a
79. Cass R. Sunstein, Nudging: A Very Short Guide, 37 J. CONSUMER POL¶Y 583, 583 (2014).
80. Id. (describing examples of nudges, including: informing customers that a bill is due, automatic
enrollment in a retirement plan, auto pay options for credit cards, and mortgages).
81. Id. at 584 (providing the rationale and examples of how nudges allow people to maintain freedom of
choice and that nudges should be ³transparent and open rather than hidden and covert.´).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 585 (³For all policies, including nudges, it is exceedingly important to rely on evidence rather than
intuitions, anecdotes, wishful thinking, or dogmas.´).
84. Sunstein, supra note 79, at 585±87 (describing ten important nudges).
85. Id. at 585 (³But some policies, including some nudges, seem promising in the abstract but turn out to fail
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tremendous amount of flexibility in the implementation of any policy that seeks particular
behaviors and can be accomplished in a cost-effective manner.
Emerging technologies present a distinct issue because of risk perception. People
tend to prefer a known risk even if it is higher than a likely lower risk with a new
technology.86 Nudging people to take the new, likely lower risk, creates challenges. It is
possible to increase the ease and convenience of buying foods from GMOs, but this nudge
may not be effective given the overwhelming marketing done by the organic food industry.
It is not that a nudge could not work, but it raises questions of efficacy in the biotechnology
arena that need to be explored.
B. Risk Hybrid
Perhaps a hybrid of decision-making theory and policy implementation, the concept
of Performativity helps explain the effect of risk communication on a person¶s assignment
of risk. Work by P. Marijin Poorvliet, Kai Purnhagen, and others attempt to distinguish
between risk as perception and risk as analysis although as a reality, they acknowledge
these categories are not realistically exclusive and suggest the term risk hybrid. 87 In this
way, Poorvliet and Purnhagen frame the real problem, which is how risk communication
impacts risk assessment.88
The idea of risk hybrid, in which the subjective and objective communication of risk
meet, is particularly apt in controversial areas. Political views, divergent perspectives,
industrial parties, and scientists may have divergent perceptions. 89 How these modalities
are communicated to people impact the development of the risk debate.90 This perception
of risk helps to explain or understand how people make decisions in which they
appropriately or inappropriately assign risk.91 While it may seem that objective risk
assessment should be the preferred method of communication in order for people to make
an appropriate assessment of risk, the reality is that people receive both objective and
subjective information. To further complicate matters, even an objective risk assessment
may really be a probability; thus, some range of risk exists depending on a number of
assumptions that may or may not hold.92 Therefore, any discussion of risk communication
in practice.´).
86. Cf. Ellsberg, supra note 2, at 657.
87. P. Marijn Poortvliet, Martjin Duineveld & Kai Purnhagen, Performativity in Action: How Risk
Communication Interacts in Risk Regulation, 7 EURO. J. RISK REG. 213, 214 (2016) (³Objectified and perceived
risks will be difficult ± if not sometimes impossible ± to separate in practice. As an alternative we introduce the
concept of risk hybrids, which combines objectified risk (how the risk is represented in risk analysis) and a
perceived risk and nullifies the a-priory made distinction between the two.´).
88. Id. (³By observing how different risk communications perform different risk hybrids in the various
contexts in which they emerge, we show how the concept of risk hybrids can offer a richer understanding of risk
communication practices.´).
89. Id. at 213 (³Numerous reasons, such as divergent perspectives, ways of communication, and interests,
explain why involved actors often find themselves locked in a controversy.´).
90. Id. (³For instance, in the GMO debates environmental politicians, NGOs, industrial parties, consumers,
and GMO scientists have exerted very distinct ways of communication, resulting in a highly polarized and
contested gene-risk landscape´).
91. Id. (³A key conceptual distinction made within such debates, among academics, in the literature, and in
wider society, is one between perceived or subjective risks on the one hand, and factual or objective risks on the
other.´).
92. Poortvliet, supra note 87, at 214 (³In risk assessment many different conceptualizations of risk and
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and the impact thereof must acknowledge this reality.
How risk is communicated to people is extremely important for policy
implementation. In general, good government policy is supported by an evidence-based
risk assessment. In some cases the evidence-based risk assessment is correct. But, what
happens when it is wrong? People may lose trust in the government and its policies. This
potential distrust can also sway a balance in a risk hybrid communication scenario, where
people might believe perceived risks over objective risks, especially if they distrust that an
objective risk assessment is possible.
Even assuming arguendo that people do not distrust, or have no reason to distrust,
an objective risk assessment, research demonstrates that people do not necessarily make
rational decisions.93 In other words, perceived risks help us to understand why people may
inappropriately assign risk (e.g., assigning a higher risk to flying than driving a car).94
Because government actors are not the only communicators of risk, studying how
risk communication impacts people¶s risk assessment is quite challenging. The media may
pick up a story and their risk communication can insert a different ratio in the risk hybrid²
either more objective or more perceived. Other interested actors, say those that oppose a
particular regulation, may also communicate risk. Obtaining an understanding of these
influences and how to communicate evidence-based risk assessment poses an enormous
challenge.
C. Notice and Comment
Public participation through notice and comment may also present a way for the
public to engage and be informed in regulatory policy creation and implementation.
Important work by Ed Rubin and others analyze the mechanisms in which agencies can
implement policies either through voluntary guidance documents or a formal rulemaking
process with notice and comment.95 Without describing the intricate machinations of how
an agency knows whether to use guidance or formal rulemaking, the larger message is the
ability for the public to engage with the agency through the notice and comment process.
Rubin proposes that, in cases in which the policy addresses an issue subject to public
controversy, agencies should engage in notice and comment.96 The purpose is not just for

uncertainty can be used. Examples of risk concepts include risk as an expected value, as a probability distribution,
as an expected disutility, as an epistemic or stochastic uncertainty, as a simple threshold level for when a
substance is deemed to be hazardous and so forth.´).
93. Id. at 213±14 (discussing the difference between perceived and actual risk).
94. Id. at 215 (³For example, some travelers are quite worried about the safety of taking a plane but [sic] not
even consider the ± statistically much greater ± risk of driving to the airport.´).
95. Edward L. Rubin & Joanna K. Sax, Administrative Guidance and Genetically Modified Food, 60 ARIZ.
L. REV. 539, 566 (2018) (³In our system, the specific technique to which the term µguidance¶ has generally been
attached is a type of rule under the APA. Section 553 of the APA prescribes procedures for two types of
rulemaking: formal rulemaking, which must follow the same trial-type procedures as adjudications under section
556 and 557 of the statute, and informal rulemaking, which must follow only the much less demanding notice
and comment procedure specified in section 553 itself.´). This article was co-authored, but the intellectual muscle
related to administrative law is properly attributed to Ed Rubin.
96. Id. at 582 (³A remedially oriented approach to the review of guidance documents would satisfy both the
instrumental and normative goals of notice and comment procedure and the countervailing goal of rulemaking
flexibility. To begin with, this approach suggests that notice and comment rulemaking should only be imposed
on agency pronouncements to the general public.´).
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good government practices; rather, it is a way for the public to participate and to
(hopefully) be educated in the process. Both the engagement and the education may allow
people to appropriately assign risk when the final rule, for example, is implemented.
Agencies should rely on evidence-based assessments to support any policy
implementation. In addition, the actors within the agency are supposed to be able to
differentiate between scientific support and consumer misperception. Assuming the actors
within the agency behave this way, an assumption that may not always stand, the final
policy should assign the evidence-based risk assessment. But, the process to obtain the
final policy is what could allow people to come to the same conclusion as the agency or,
at least, be educated through the process. Then, once the policy is enacted, through a final
rule or other mechanism, the space between the agenc\¶V evidence-based assessment of
risk and the person¶s own risk assessment should align.
D. Overview of Risk-Communication Strategies
The strategies outlined above describe a mere sampling of ways to attempt to align
people¶s perceptions of risk with evidence-based assessment of risk. This is a nonexclusive list; rather, its purpose is to describe some thoughtful and well-studied
mechanisms for policy implementation that consider behavior and decision-making.
Additional examples exist but are not necessarily needed to support the main thesis of this
article, which is to assess the problems with decision-making as it relates to the
implementation of policies for biotechnology and the attempt to reconcile this issue with
ways to align people¶s perceptions of risk with evidence-based assessment of risk.
Aligning people¶s perceptions of risk with evidence-based assessment of risk is not
an easy task. A tremendous amount of money is spent to sway people in a particular
direction. The organic food industry, for example, has an economic interest in steering
people away from bioengineered food. This is an intentional example where big money in
a big industry is at play. Other examples are much less intentional. The anti-vax
movement, for example, may not have the same economic incentives (although perhaps
there is big money in holistic and snake oil applications), but the impact on people is
similar. In both of these cases, large groups of people inappropriately assign risk to areas
in which the scientific assessment of risk is low. This begs the important question raised
in this article, which is: how do we align risk perception with risk assessment?
III. CONTROVERSIAL AREAS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
Biotechnology in some ways faces a unique problem and in other ways faces the
same problem as any other decision. The unique fact is that biotechnology is often future
facing, which means some risks will always be unknown.97 From a scientific perspective,
these unknowns are not problematic. Scientists can predict the likelihood of risk. But, this
is highly problematic for consumers who may want to hear that there is no chance of future
harm. For example, scientists reached a consensus that food in the marketplace that is from

97. Sax (2017), supra note 12, at 474 ³[S]cientific uncertainty is part of the scientific process. Unknowns
always exist in science, but this is different than having enough information to be able to assign a probability of
risk. Consumers may have trouble differentiating between scientific uncertainty and risk.´).
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genetically engineered organisms (colloquially known as GMOs) is as safe as conventional
food.98 But, scientists cannot unequivocally state that GMOs will never have any risk in
the future. Similarly, scientists cannot unequivocally say that conventional and organic
food products will never present a harm in the future. This is not how evidence-based risk
assessment works. Not only do consumers have a difficult time assigning risk, but this
scientific process is exploited by opponents to biotechnology.99 Opponents can
communicate to consumers something as provocative as ³Even the scientists cannot tell
you with 100% certainty that the food you are eating is safe.´100 This creates all sorts of
problems that influence decision-making.
Discussed below are examples of areas of biotechnology that are not controversial
in the scientific community, but generate great controversy in the public sphere. Included
in this discussion are empirical studies in which decision-making theories help to explain
the discrepancy between consumer perception of risk and evidence-based assessment of
risk, to the extent that such empirical studies are available. In addition, this section will
highlight how different theoretical modes of decision-making, discussed in Part I, are
implicated in the disconnect between consumer perception of risk and evidence-based
assessment of risk. Furthermore, this section will discuss the thread within this article that
decision-making is complicated and that more than one theoretical basis may help to
explain the disconnect. In other words, we cannot think of the problem as silos; instead,
this article argues that it has to be addressed as a wholescale problem.
A. Genetically Engineered Food
One of the most controversial areas of biotechnology in the modern world are crops
98. Chelsea Snell et al., Assessment of the Health Impact of GM Plant Diets in Long-term and
Multigenerational Animal Feeding Trials: A Literature Review, 50 FOOD & CHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY 1134, 1145
(2012); Pamela Ronald, Plant Genetics, Sustainable Agriculture and Global Food Security, 188 GENETICS 11,
12 (2011); Press Release, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Statement by the AAAS Board
of
Directors
on
Labeling
of
Genetically
Modified
Foods
(Oct.
20,
2012),
http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/AAAS_GM_statement.pdf [hereinafter Statement by
AAAS]; Yan Song et al., Immunotoxicological Evaluation of Corn Genetically Modified with Bacillus
thuringiensis Cry1Ah Gene by a 30-day Feeding Study in BALB/c Mice, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 10 (2014)
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0078566; Yanfang Yuan et al.,
Effects of Genetically Modified T2A-1 Rice on the GI Health of Rats After 90-day Supplement, 3 SCI. REP. 1, 6±
7 (2013), http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130611/srep01962/pdf/srep01962.pdf; Xueming Tang et al., A 90Day Dietary Toxicity Study of Genetically Modified Rice T1C-1 Expressing Cry1C Protein in Sprague Dawley
Rats,
7
PLOS
ONE
1,
6
(2012),
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0052507; see also Philip D. Brune et
al., Safety of GM Crops: Compositional Analysis, 1 J. AGRIC. & FOOD CHEMISTRY 8243, 8245 (2013); William
D. Price & Lynne Underhill, Application of Laws, Policies, and Guidance from the United States and Canada to
the Regulation of Food and Feed Derived from Genetically Modified Crops: Interpretation of Composition Data,
1 J. AGRIC. FOOD & CHEMISTRY 8349, 8353 (2013); Declan Butler, Hyped GM Maize Study Faces Growing
Scrutiny, NATURE INT¶L WKLY. J. SCI. (2012), http://www.nature.com/news/hyped-gm-maize-study-facesgrowing-scrutiny-1.11566 (rejecting paper that found adverse health events in rats fed GM corn); Mischa
Popoff et al., Organics versus GMO: Why the debate?, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2013/10/15/organics-versus-gmo-why-the-debate/; A. Mukherjee et al.,
Preharvest Evaluation of Coliforms, Escherichia coli, Salmonella, and Escherichia coli O157:H7 in Organic and
Conventional Produce Grown by Minnesota Farmers, 67 J. FOOD PROTECTION 894, 894±900 (2004).
99. See infra Part IV.C.
100. Cf. Slovic & Peters, supra note 11, at 322 (explaining how the use of emotion can lead to an inappropriate
assignment of risk).
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produced from the application of biotechnology.101 These are colloquially called GMOs,
but this term is completely inadequate because some crops created through the use of
biotechnology are not genetically modified organisms. While the term µbioengineering¶ is
a more apt description, and the one being used by the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) in implementing the new labeling law, consumers recognize and
utilize the term GMO.102 In addition, the label ³GMO-free´ means something to
consumers. For this reason, this article will use the colloquial term ³GMO,´ not only due
to its familiarity, but also for the reason that it will more likely be read by consumers who
are interested in learning about GMOs.
Plants have highly dynamic genomes, and it may surprise a non-scientist to learn
that plants have a lot of changes occurring to their DNA all of the time.103 Actually, this
is one of the reasons that GMOs do not pose any higher risk compared to conventional
breeding techniques.104 A small change to a plant¶s DNA through biotechnology
techniques is less invasive than what happens through traditional breeding techniques.105
Either way, if the change to the genome through biotechnology or traditional breeding
techniques creates genomic instability, the plant will simply die. If the plant can withstand
the change, it will survive and grow.106
For some crops, the genomes are already highly selected through traditional
breeding techniques, and the only way to obtain another favorable trait is through the
application of techniques in biotechnology. This is particularly true for clonally
propagated and highly heterozygous crops, which already have highly selected
background.107 No form of traditional breeding technique can likely achieve such a result,
or even if it could achieve it theoretically, the likelihood that traditional breeding could
101. William Saletan, Unhealthy Fixation: The war against genetically modified organisms is full of
fearmongering, errors, and fraud. Labeling them will not make you safer., SLATE (July 15, 2015 5:45 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2015/07/are_gmos_safe_yes_the_case_against_them
_is_full_of_fraud_lies_and_errors.html.; cf. Gregory Conko, Drew L. Kershen, Henry Miller & Wayne A.
Parrott, A Risk-Based Approach to the Regulation of Genetically Engineered Organisms, 34 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 493, 493 (2016) (promoting a risk based regulatory approach).
102. See Pub. L. No. 114-216, 130 Stat. 834 (July 29, 2016) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 293(a)(1)) (directing the
Secretary of the USDA to ³establish a national mandatory bioengineered food disclosure standard with respect
to any bioengineered food and any food that may be bioengineered . . . ´ within two years of the date of
enactment of this law); see also USDA, Establishing the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard,
U.S. DEP¶T OF AGRIC. (last visited Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.usda.gov/media/pressreleases/2018/12/20/establishing-national-bioengineered-food-disclosure-standard.
103. Steven H. Strauss & Joanna K. Sax, Ending Event-Based Regulation of GMO Crops, 34 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 474, 476 (2016) (³These studies show evidence of far greater structural, epigenetic and geneexpression variation than had been expected, in general, far exceeding those imparted by genetic engineering
(e.g., refs. 11,24,25,26).´).
104. Id. (³Gene insertion appears to be a small impact by comparison to the ongoing dynamic variation in gene
and genome structure during evolution and breeding´ and citing references 22 and 24 therein); Natalie Weber,
et. al., Crop Genome Plasticity and Its Relevance to Food and Feed Safety of Genetically Engineered Breeding
Stacks, 160 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 1842, 1842 (2012) [hereinafter Weber (2012)].
105. Id. (³Thus, the risk of unintended expression of endogenous toxic proteins from genetic engineering is no
greater than conventional breeding, and in most cases far less.´); see also Conko et al., supra note 101, at 493±
99.
106. See Conko et al., supra note 101, at 494 (providing a history of genetic modification); Weber (2012),
supra note 104, at 1848±89 (discussing the reasons why both large-scale mutations during breeding and genetic
engineering techniques do not cause safety issues).
107. Strauss & Sax, supra note 103, at 475.
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obtain it through mutation or otherwise is so remote that it is simply not a feasible
approach.108
The science behind GMOs is probably the most fascinating part of the relatively
easy explanation as to why food from GMOs is as safe as conventional food.109 Oddly,
some people do not even have an inkling that all of our crops are genetically modified
because we grow domesticated crops²which by definition are genetically modified.110
The label ³organic´ does not mean that it is a wild-type variety.111 Rather, it is a
genetically modified crop that is grown under ³organic´ farming techniques.112 In other
words, everything we eat is genetically modified. That people are concerned about GMOs
because it is ³messing´ with the DNA demonstrates a complete lack of understanding
about our food supply.113 Ignorance is not the only explanation; however, the
complications in decision-making and risk assessment are critical in this misunderstanding
as well.
The controversy around GMOs has not been ignored by those interested in decisionmaking and consumer perceptions of risk. One study tested whether the theory of
ambiguity aversion might help to explain the disconnect between consumer risk perception
and evidence-based risk assessment.114 This study found that participants who responded
to predictor questions in a way that suggested aversion to ambiguous information likewise
responded to scenarios about foods from GMOs as being high risk and low benefit.115 In
addition, participants who indicated an initial bias against foods from GMOs, similarly
assigned high risk and low benefit to scenarios in which the risk of a food from a GMO
was described as low.116 This study suggested that one component of decision-making, at
least with respect to the disconnect over foods from GMOs, might be a result of ambiguity
108. Cf. id. (describing the Artic Apple and Innate Potato as examples of this).
109. Rubin & Sax, supra note 95, at 543±48 (describing the science of genetically engineered food).
110. Id. at 543 (³People have been systematically altering the genetic composition of the food they eat for
thousands of years. Many of the plant and animal products that appear in even the earliest historical records
resulted from centuries, if not millennia, of selective breeding and vary greatly from anything that could be found
in nature.´).
111. See, e.g., David Newland, Sorry Hipsters, That Organic Kale Is a Genetically Modified Food,
SMITHSONIAN MAG (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science/sorry-hipsters-organic-kalegenetically-modified-food-180952656/?no-ist.
112. See
USDA,
Organic
Agriculture
(last
modified
Jan.
9,
2015),
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=organic-agriculture.html
(describing organic agriculture).
113. Strauss & Sax, supra note 103, at 475±76 (2016) (³In recent years, as knowledge of genomes has
increased, it has become clear that DNA undergoes extensive and dynamic changes in nature and under
conventional breeding. These studies show evidence of far greater structural, epigenetic and gene expression
variation than had been expected, in general, far exceeding those imparted by genetic engineering. Moreover, the
variations observed are of little consequence for food safety.´).
114. Sax & Doran (2019), supra note 6, at 49 (³The present study was designed to evaluate whether a
presentation of missing or conflicting information creates ambiguity and predicts how people make decisions
about biotechnology. In this way, a general theme of ambiguity aversion, also referred to herein as openness to
missing or conflicting information, may help explain the existing disconnect between scientific consensus and
consumer perceptions of risk.´).
115. Id. at 55 (³Overall, participants in this study indicated aversion to implementing new technology even
with a description indicating that that it was likely low risk and high benefit.´).
116. Id. at 56 (³Interestingly, participants showed the most ambiguity aversion to the food category. It is
possible that the current debate about foods from GMOs makes this category more salient to consumers compared
to other issues.´).
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aversion.117 These results allow policymakers to consider this decision-making process in
generating and communicating policies regarding GMOs.118
The role of affect in risk perception in various areas of technology is supported by
numerous empirical studies. Specifically, for GMOs, studies indicate that implicit attitudes
and affect impact how consumers perceive GMOs. 119 These studies have some
imperfections but at least provide some sense of how affect impacts risk perception and
helps to explain why consumers perception of risk is different than evidence-based
assessment of risk.
One study analyzed whether fear or disgust served as the affective predictor in
attitudes towards GMOs.120 This study used survey methodology and employed predictor
questions to understand a range of responses to particular events, such as stepping on dog
poop or seeing a cockroach run across the floor, to score affective measures of disgust.121
Using these predictive measures, the authors could analyze the affective response to new
technologies, including GMOs.122 The authors learned that participants demonstrated
more of a creeped out feeling towards GMOs compared to a tendency to be disgusted. This
tendency to be creeped out indicates that fear might be driving the opposition to GMOs as
compared to disgust.123 The authors tied in the results of the study with other research
demonstrating that when people understand technology, they do not tend to be as fearful
or creeped out.124
Cultural cognition may also help to explain people¶s differing views on GMOs.125
The application of cultural cognition is done by analogy to other areas of technology in
which researchers seek to understand consumer decision-making, such as nanotechnology.
In one study the researchers found that providing balanced information about
nanotechnology did not support a finding that familiarity with the subject might predict
the assignment of risks and benefits.126 Instead, the authors found support that the
participants¶ attitudes towards nanotechnology could be explained by ³psychological
117. Id. at 55±57.
118. Id. at 56 (³This study also provides important insights for the mechanism of implementing evidencebased policies. Consumers can find conflicting information on the internet, for example, about vaccines and
autism. However, the scientific evidence is clear that no link exists. Understanding why and how consumers
respond to the presentation of information and misinformation, which is demonstrated by inappropriately
assigning risk, may provide important information to develop communication and other strategies to close the
divide between consumer perceptions of risk and scientific assessment of risk.´).
119. Edward Rozyman, Corey Cusimano & Robert F. Leeman, What Lies Beneath? Fear vs. Disgust as
Affective Predictors of Absolutist Opposition to Genetically Modified Food and Other New Technologies, 12
JUDGEMENT & DECISION MAKING 466, 472 (2017) (³First, our data indicate that Scott et al.¶s (2016) original
result±traditionally assessed trait disgust is a modest yet significant predictor of absolutist opposition to
genetically modified food ± is quite robust.´); but see Spence & Townsend, supra note 21, at 72.
120. Rozyman et al., supra note 119, at 467±68.
121. Id. at 469±70.
122. Id. at 470±71.
123. Id. at 471.
124. Id. at 472±74.
125. Kahan and colleagues assessed perceptions of risk as it relates to GMOs, although the study that did this
was more focused on nanotechnology. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 744. Additional empirical studies are
needed.
126. Kahan et al. (2008), supra note 30, at 87±88 (³Finding no support for the familiarity hypothesis, the study
instead yielded strong evidence that public attitudes are likely to be shaped by psychological dynamics associated
with cultural cognition.´).
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dynamics associated with cultural cognition.´127 The authors hypothesized that even with
balanced information, participants will not ³adopt uniformly positive attitudes, as the
familiarity hypothesis suggests, [rather] members of the public who hold relatively
egalitarian and communitarian worldviews will perceive its risks to be greater, and its
benefits smaller, than will persons who hold relatively hierarchal and individualistic
worldviews.´128 This study found that exposure to information had no discernable effect
on the participants¶ perceptions of risks and benefits.129 Instead, the participants¶
worldviews explained the risk assessment. 130 When exposed to information about
nanotechnology, it was clear that the participants¶ world view was the variable that most
explained the risk assignment, at least under the experimental conditions.131 In other
words, when provided with information about nanotechnology, participants ³conform[ed]
information to their predispositions.´132 In this case, participants with a worldview
associated with hierarchical and individualistic tended to be skeptical about technological
risks. When provided with information about nanotechnology, they behaved as expected
and did not assign a high risk.133 In contrast, participants associated with the egalitarian
and communitarian point of view reacted less favorably when information about new
technology was brought to their attention.134
Although an empirical study is needed, the cultural cognition/nanotechnology study
provides some insight as to how people may respond to information about GMOs. 135
Those that are generally skeptical about technological risk will assign a low risk and high
benefit when provided information about foods made from GMOs. 136 Whereas, those with
a worldview that is skeptical of technology will respond in the opposite direction. This
begs the question that is discussed in section IV, which is whether to provide balanced
information at all? In other worlds, one might think a priori that providing balanced
information is the fairest approach. But, if providing balanced information does not allow
people to appropriately assign risk, or at least align their risk perception with evidencebased risk assessment, then providing balanced information may not accomplish the
goal.137
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (³Information exposure had no discernable main effect on subjects¶ perceptions of nanotechnology
risks and benefits.´).
130. Id. at 88 (³These results support the cultural cognition hypothesis but not the familiarity hypothesis. Our
subjects did not react uniformly, much less in a uniformly positive manner, when exposed to information. Instead,
they reacted divergently, in a manner consistent with their opposing cultural predispositions toward technological
risk generally. This finding displays the signature of µbiased assimilation and polarization¶²the tendency of
persons to conform information to their predispositions and thus to become more, not less, divided when exposed
to balanced information.´).
131. Kahan et al. (2008), supra note 30, at 88.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 89 (³People who have a protechnology cultural orientation are thus more likely to become exposed
to information about nanotechnology and to draw positive inferences from what they discover.´).
134. Id. (³Individuals who lack that predisposition, in contrast, are less likely to become exposed to
information, and when they do become exposed to it they are significantly more likely to react negatively.´).
135. This familiarity with nanotechnology correlated with risk perception about GMOs. See Kahan (2012),
supra note 2, at 744.
136. See Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 744 fig.28.11.
137. Id. at 752±53 (describing that providing balanced information has no effect on risk perception).
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Availability heuristics and dual process theory also help to underscore the public
opposition to GMOs. With so much marketing against GMOs, it makes sense that
consumers¶ system 1 (or quick thinking) assumes that all GMOs are harmful.138
Consumers can draw on commercials on television that tout their product is GMO free or
the labels in the supermarket clearly stating that a product is GMO free. 139 Even a bottle
of carbonated water is labeled as GMO free²which is completely silly.140 Still, all of this
information is instant and present and feeds the system 1 decision-making process to think
that if it is labeled as GMO free, then there must be a reason for it, and one reason could
be safety.141 The slow thinking process of System 2 is needed to evaluate the scientific
consensus that foods from GMOs are as safe as conventional food.142 In addition, the slow
thinking process is needed to analyze the scientific research that the technology is likely
beneficial to address malnutrition²the leading cause of death and disease worldwide.143
So, how would one get consumers to slow down and process the food labels with
System 2? It seems unlikely. This means that some sort of communication method may be
needed to support a system 1 process where consumers have a heuristic to draw on that
food from GMOs are safe. Perhaps the removal of the GMO free label as misleading is
one way, as some have called for. Or, perhaps some sort of label supporting GMOs, which
allows consumers to quickly evaluate the safety that is in line with the evidence-based
assessment of risk.
Biotechnology presents an interesting application of decision-making theories
because it is progressive and new information is discovered and applied. Scientific
assessment of risk can never be absolute; it is simply a likely probability that the risk is
determined to be high or low. This creates openings to exploit even a minimal risk²and
even a much lower risk compared to doing nothing. This is the case with our food supply²
we have competing problems that need to be addressed: climate change and a growing
population. We need to feed more people in a sustainable way. Doing nothing about how
we grow our food is riskier than doing something. Bringing consumers along for this
complicated discussion already poses challenges. In Part IV, this article discusses ways to
approach this. But, in the vein of this article, another area of biotechnology in which
rejecting the technology creates more harm, i.e., not vaccinating, is discussed below.
138. The NY Times is sometimes aggressively anti-GMO or at the very least equivocal, which is not the
scientific consensus. See, e.g., Jane Brody, Are G.M.O. Foods Safe?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/23/well/eat/are-gmo-foods-safe.html. (When a consumer conducts an
internet search for the safety of GMOs, they can find equivocal or mis-information, the NY Times is just an
example.)
139. Cf. FDA, Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been
Derived from Genetically Engineered Plants (2019), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fdaguidance-documents/guidance-industry-voluntary-labeling-indicating-whether-foods-have-or-have-not-beenderived (³Manufacturers often voluntarily provide information on their labels beyond the information required
by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the FD&C Act) or FDA regulations. Their reasons for doing so may have
to do with marketing or providing information of specific interest to their customers.´).
140. See, e.g., Josie Peterson, ³GMO Free Water´? Don¶t be Fooled by Misleading Labels, BIOTECHNOW
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.biotech-now.org/food-and-agriculture/2017/09/gmo-free-water-dont-be-fooled-bymisleading-labels.
141. Peter M. Wiedermann & Holger Schutz, The Precautionary Principle and Risk Perception: Experimental
Studies in the EMF Area, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 402, 402±05 (2005).
142. See Statement by AAAS, supra note 98.
143. Cf. Lynas, supra note 78, at 270.
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B. Vaccines
As of late, vaccinating children is a serious and controversial issue.144 Some parents
are hesitant or declining to vaccinate their children, which creates a major health issue for
the unvaccinated children and a larger public health issue for the community.145 The
movement against vaccines is surprising to health officials, especially considering the
evidence-based research demonstrating that vaccines are safe and effective against vaccine
preventable diseases.146 At first blush, one might simply say that parents who resist
vaccinations are dumb (to be blunt), but studies in decision-making demonstrate that it is
more complicated.
An interesting study by Blaisdell and colleagues utilized focus groups to analyze
whether ambiguity aversion helped to explain the decisions by vaccine hesitant parents
(VHPs).147 In these focus groups, Blaisdell learned that VHPs inappropriately assigned
risk because they responded that they were concerned, for example, that once a vaccine is
given it cannot be undone.148 Interestingly, putting aside the need for boosters, this is
exactly what medical professionals seek.149 But, the VHPs expressed that because it
cannot be undone, then if there was some side effect, the parents have irreversibly harmed
the child.150 In other words, the parents assigned a high risk and low benefit. Another
expressed opinion by VHPs is that if their child gets the disease, then they can just take
them to the hospital.151 VHPs inappropriately assigned a low risk to the actual disease.
The study itself is worthy of a close read, but to summarize here, the study provided
important insight to help understand how VHPs make decisions regarding whether or not
to vaccinate.152
Although not explicitly addressed by the Blaisdell study, it is possible that affect
also plays a key role.153 The VHPs may fear that the vaccine will cause irreversible
144. CDC, Measles Cases and Outbreaks (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/measles/casesoutbreaks.html.
145. Cf. Governor Jerry Brown (CA) executed a law that eliminates some of the exemptions for vaccines. S.B.
277, 2015±16 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); see also Tara Haelle, California Vaccination Bill SB 277 Signed By
Governor,
Becomes
Law,
FORBES
(June
30,
2015,
2:14
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tarahaelle/2015/06/30/california-vaccination-bill-sb-277-signed-by-governorbecomes-law/#6091044a1233.
146. See CDC, Vaccine Safety (last updated Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/index.html.
147. Blaisdell et al., supra note 8, at 480 (³We conducted a qualitative focus group study of VHPs with the
specific aim of exploring the extent to which they perceive ambiguity in vaccine-associated risks and the thought
processes underlying their subjective judgments of risk and uncertainty in decisions about vaccination.´).
148. Id. at 482 (Others were fearful of the permanence of vaccination decisions and exposures (Table 3).
149. CDC,
Attention
Adults:
You
Need
Vaccines
Too!
(Feb.
25,
2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/features/adultimmunizations/index.html (³Every year in the United States, thousands of
adults become seriously ill and are hospitalized because of diseases that vaccines can help prevent.´).
150. Blaisdell, supra note 8, at 483 tbl.3 (quoting a VHP: ³One of the scary things about vaccines is once it¶s
done, it¶s done. You can¶t undo it. So you know I have this kid and maybe or maybe not vaccines have an effect
on his progression in life at this point.´).
151. Id. at 484 tbl.5 (quoting a VHP: ³I think that now if you catch something, all these dreadful diseases, if
you rush to the hospital right away they can probably save your life. So I¶d rather go with that and see if something
happens then go that way [vaccinate].´).
152. Id. at 485±87.
153. Sax (2017), supra note 12, at 447 (³While the Blaisdell study nicely categorizes the responses by VHPs
into risk perceptions based on ambiguity, many of the responses suggest affect could play a role in risk
perception.´).
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damage, such as autism.154 This feeling of fear (or dread) may also help explain why VHPs
assign a high risk and low benefit to vaccines.155 Feelings of fear and dread are known to
impact decision-making and risk perception.156
The application of cultural cognition to VHPs presents a few possible explanations.
A priori, it might seem that persons placed on the ³group-grid´ associated with the
communitarianism-egalitarian viewpoint would vaccinate because this would be best for
the community. But, if we think about the study on nanotechnology, those with a
community point of view may be skeptical of new technology and perceive a high risk.157
This could suggest that VHPs in the communitarianism-egalitarian group-grid could
actually explain the hesitation to vaccinate, which, in the end, is actually worse for the
community. In contrast, those with an individualistic outlook may assess the risk from new
technology as low and be more likely to vaccinate. In other words, it is possible that
cultural cognition helps to explain risk assessment in a way that helps us to understand
VHPs. Alternatively, perhaps vaccines are not as new to individuals as nanotechnology.
Thus, perhaps drawing on the nanotechnology study is too far a stretch.158 If so, then the
egalitarian point of view favors vaccination because it protects the community. Or, perhaps
a more cynical view is that VHPs form their own communities in which they form a
consensus that vaccines are risky (making the non-evidence-based association with
autism); thus, they either are hesitant to vaccinate or refuse altogether.159 This conforms
with the viewpoint of their community. In sum, it seems that the viewpoint of the
community could impact the risk assessment.160
Heuristics and dual process theory can be used to explain decision made by VHPs.
The system 1 decision-making process may perceive risk and if a person feels or believes
that there is a risk to vaccines, such as autism, then that person may be hesitant or resist
vaccines.161 The fear of a life-long condition, such as autism, is the undercurrent for the
system 1 reaction against vaccines.162 Of course, we know that vaccines do not cause
autism, but that may not be what a VHP believes.163 Likewise, a VHP, operating under

154. A.J. Wakefield et al., Ileal-lymphoid-docular hyperplasia, non-specific colitis, and pervasive
developmental disorder in children, 351 THE LANCET 637, 637±41 (retracted) (1998), available at
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(97)11096-0/abstract.
155. Sax (2017), supra note 12, at 447 (³If VHPs perceive that a vaccine will harm their child, they will feel
µbadness¶ about making the decision to vaccinate. Or, conversely, a VHP may experience µgoodness¶ of refusing
a vaccine because s/he perceives they have averted a high-risk situation. This scenario nicely fits into Slovic and
colleagues¶ theory that when a subject views the risk as high, they also view the benefit as low.´).
156. Slovic & Peters, supra note 11, at 322.
157. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 88.
158. But see id. at 744 (chart showing that risk perception related to nanotechnology is correlated with risk
perception in other areas).
159. Mara Gordon, Medical Anthropologist Explores µVaccine Hesitancy¶, NPR (Feb. 13, 2019, 5:50 PM)
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/02/13/694449743/medical-anthropologist-explores-vaccinehesitancy (³What makes some families reluctant to vaccinate their children? Sobo, a professor at San Diego State
University, says it may be driven in part by the desire to conform in a community where many parents are
skeptical of vaccines.´).
160. Id.
161. IMMUNIZATION ACTION COAL., Autism (July 29, 2019), http://www.immunize.org/autism/ (³Claims that
vaccines cause autism have led to some parents to delay or refuse vaccines for their children.´).
162. Cf. Blaisdell et al., supra note 8, at 483 tbl.2.
163. A.J. Wakefield et al., supra note 154, at 637±41.
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system 1, may not fear the vaccine preventable disease. 164 This demonstrates the very
problem with a VHP using system 1. It is fear, for example, that might be the crux of the
system 1 decision²but in this case, it is the fear of the wrong condition.165 The VHP
should fear the vaccine preventable disease. The system 2 process, in which the VHP,
might evaluate the data regarding the safety and efficacy of vaccines, is needed.166 For a
non-VHP, the system 1 process kicks in to make the decision to vaccinate. In this case, the
fear of the vaccine preventable disease is easy to process. No system 2 process is needed.
In sum, the decision-making theories described herein all help to elucidate how
consumers approach their thinking towards a controversial area of biotechnology.
Cognitively, it makes sense that a discussion can be had regarding how each theory
explains the public¶s reaction to GMOs and vaccines. What is unclear, however, is whether
any person relies more heavily on one theory over another. How do we know which
decision-making process is dominant at any time? Or, perhaps, portions of these theories
are working concurrently. To add more to the mix, this article raises the concern about
how changes in society interact, utilize, or even exploit these decision-making theories in
a way that makes it even harder to combat an inappropriate assignment of risk.
IV. MODERN VARIABLES THAT IMPACT DECISION-MAKING
Assuming arguendo that all of the decision-making theories described in this article
meaningfully describe how people make decisions (and possibly judgements), the salient
question becomes how do we allow people to make decisions in which their risk perception
is in line with evidence-based risk assessment. This does not mean that people will
automatically embrace new technology just because their risk perception is in line with
evidence-based risk assessment, but it means that people can make decisions based on
accurate information. For example, a person may decide not to vaccinate, for a religious
reason, but not based on a perception that vaccines are unsafe, or at least less safe than
acquiring a vaccine preventable disease.
It is not that the decision-making theories do not stand²they do. The problem is
that they can be used to persuade people into making an incorrect risk assessment. This is
quite a concern because the world is facing major problems, such as climate change. This
article proposes three categories in modern society that appear to impact consumer
perceptions of risk. These three categories, which are variable inputs in people¶s
perception of risk are: (1) rise of individualism, (2) internet, and (3) economics, which are
discussed below. This article seeks to expose how these categories impact a person¶s
assignment of risk.
A. Rise of Individualism
In his book, The Second Mountain, David Brooks describes changes in society from

164. Hattie Garlick, µWorry is contagious¶: the vaccine-hesitant parents putting children at risk, THE
GUARDIAN (July 13, 2019, 5:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/jul/13/vaccines-hesitantparents-threat-to-global-health (discussing how the success of immunizations programs has the effect that people
are not as worried about the vaccine preventable disease).
165. Id.
166. CDC, Vaccine Safety (last updated Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/index.html.
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small and tight communities to a more individualistic priority.167 Brooks acknowledges
that this is not all bad. The small and tight communities from the 1950s, for example, bred
racism and sexism.168 Breaking out of those communities, particularly in the 1960s,
allowed for the civil rights movement, access to reproductive services, and more individual
rights.169 These changes, which Brooks acknowledges, are positive. But, there are
externalities to these changes in society. The movement from community to individualism
has changed the level of happiness or joy, according to Brooks.170 In other words, people
feel less connected to other people in their community because of the rise of individualism.
Brooks suggests that the pendulum has moved too far, and we need to find a better balance
of community and individualism.171
This article does not necessarily agree or adopt the pathway laid by Brooks, but it is
certainly provocative enough not to ignore. It is clear that society has changed from the
1950s to today. It is correct that individual rights and freedoms are more recognized today
compared to seventy years ago.172 Maybe people are less joyful, as Brooks suggests,
although that is a tough one to analyze, and this article will not go down that path.
Nevertheless, Brooks certainly targets individualism as a notable component of today¶s
society, and that concept in and of itself is worthy of discussion.
The decision-making theories described herein also face a structural problem in our
society, which is how people obtain their information and how they view themselves in
society at large.173 Described eloquently in The Second Mountain, David Brooks captures
the tone of hyper-individualism and how that keeps us from connecting to one another.174
The movement from small communities in the 1950s (which he acknowledges allowed for
a lot of discrimination) towards individualism leads people to possibly be less happy and
engaged in their surroundings.175 Some people search for connection in new ways, such

167. BROOKS, supra note 73, at 6.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 10 (³I just want to emphasize that the march toward freedom produced many great outcomes. The
individualistic culture that emerged in the sixties broke through many of the chains that held down women and
oppressed minorities. It loosened the bonds of racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, and homophobia.´).
170. Id. at xxix, 10 (³But many ideas become false when taken to the extreme. America has always had a more
individualistic culture than other places, which Tocqueville noticed back in the 1830s. But when individualism
becomes the absolutely dominant ethos of a civilization²when it is not counterbalanced with any competing
ethos²then the individuals within it may have maximum freedom, but the links between the individuals slowly
begin to dissolve. The grand narrative of µI¶m Free to Be Myself¶ has been playing out for about fifty years. It
has evolved into a culture of hyper-individualism. This moral ecology is built on a series of ideas or
assumptions.´).
171. Id. at 13 (³There¶s always a tension between self and society. If things are too tightly bound, then the
urge to rebel is strong. But we¶ve got the opposite problem. In a culture of µI¶m Free to be Myself,¶ individuals
are lonely and loosely attached. Community is attenuated, connections are dissolved, and loneliness spreads. This
situation makes it difficult to be good²to fulfill the deep human desires for love and connection. It¶s hard on
people of all ages, but it¶s especially hard on young adults.´).
172. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2071 (2015).
173. Caitlin Dewey, 36 ways the Web has changed us, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2014/03/12/36-ways-the-web-has-changedus/?noredirect=on (describing all the different ways the internet impacts our lives).
174. BROOKS, supra note 73, at 13.
175. Id. at 6, 19 (³Living online often means living in a state of diversion. When you¶re living in diversion
you¶re not actually deeply interested in things; you¶re just bored at a more frenetic pace. Online life is saturated
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as online communities. This may, in turn, lead to group thinking, which can make it even
harder to assess information and/or impact decision-making.
Research in decision-making is certainly applicable to help us understand how
people make decisions in a hyper-individualized society. For example, ambiguity aversion
can be used to explain how people in an online group/community (e.g., Facebook group)
may receive information about a link between vaccines and autism, which they cannot
completely ignore even when a doctor tells them that no such link exists. In essence, the
decision-making theories are robust and can continue to explain decision-making even
when society changes.
Here is a scenario in which individualism is problematic from a public health
standpoint: A VHP decides not to vaccinate because they inappropriately assign a high
risk to vaccines and they do not want their child to possibly develop autism. The nonvaccinated child is somewhat protected by herd immunity.176 But, if too many individuals
or VHPs make the same decision, then herd immunity is lost. Actually, these VHPs can
form their own community, which makes things worse for the non-vaccinated children in
that community.177 The children now have a much higher risk of contracting a vaccinepreventable disease.
In this scenario, all of the decision-making theories described above can get the
VHPs to their decision. Ambiguity aversion is at play because the VHPs receive
information that the vaccines work to protect against disease and that autism might be a
consequence of the vaccine²this is received as ambiguous information and the VHP
inappropriately assigns risk.178 Affect is at play because the VHPs experience fear that
their child will develop autism.179 Cultural cognition could be at play because the VHP
places on the communitarianism-egalitarianism spectrum in the ³group-grid,´ which has
been shown to be adverse to new technology, and they assign a high risk to the
technology.180 Finally, availability heuristics and dual process are at play because the VHP
may be using their system 1 thinking; the VHP hears about the link between vaccines and
autism and immediately concludes the risk is too high.181 System 2 is needed to fully
evaluate the scientific consensus, but we know from Kahneman¶s work that is unlikely to
happen.
A similar scenario can be described with GMOs. The Honey Sweet plum is an
excellent example (although it never made it to market). Scientists created a genetically
engineered plum that is resistant to plum pox.182 Due to the regulatory process, the U.S.

with decommitment devices. If you can¶t focus your attention for thirty seconds, how on earth are you going to
commit for life?´).
176. The College of Physicians of Philadelphia, Herd Immunity, THE HISTORY OF VACCINES (last visited Jan.
22, 2020), https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/herd-immunity-0 (animation explaining herd immunity).
177. See Gordon, supra note 159.
178. See, e.g., Blaisdell et al., supra note 8, at 486 (³Second, our study suggests that ambiguity and ambiguity
aversion are manifest in varying degrees in VHPs¶ responses to vaccine-related risks.´).
179. Cf. Slovic & Peters, supra note 11, at 322.
180. Cf. Kahan et al. (2008), supra note 30, at 88; see also Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 744.
181. Cf. KAHNEMAN (2011), supra note 22, at 19±24.
182. USDA AGRIC. RESEARCH SERV., Honeysweet Plum Trees A Transgenic Answer to the Plum Pox
Problem, USDA AGRIC. RESEARCH SERV. (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.ars.usda.gov/oc/br/plumpox/index/
(providing answers to frequently asked questions).
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government required that this plum include a pesticide label. 183 From a scientific
standpoint, this is completely absurd because the point of the honey sweet plum is to allow
it to have internal resistance to plum pox, given that external attempts to control the spread
of plum pox virus are not viable.184 The risk to human health from eating a honey sweet
plum approaches zero.185 Thus, consumers should assign a low risk and high benefit²
low risk because less external pesticide (against the aphids that carry the virus) and high
benefit because it is a piece of fruit.186 Nevertheless, consumers are unlikely to purchase
a honey sweet plum both due to the label of a pesticide and the inappropriate assignment
of risk to genetically engineered food.187 This is an incorrect risk assessment because
genetically engineered crops, such as the honey sweet plum, are likely more sustainable.
Again, individualism is problematic, and all of the decision-making theories
described herein may be at play for the consumer at the grocery store. Ambiguity aversion
is at play because the consumer receives different information about the safety of
genetically engineered foods, especially now that so many products are labeled GMOfree.188 Why label it if it does not matter? This is what a typical consumer might think,
thus the consumer assigns a high risk to genetically engineered food.189 Affect may be at
play because the consumer fears the pesticide label on the honey sweet plum, for example.
Who wants to eat a piece of fruit labeled as a pesticide? Cultural cognition may be at play
because the consumer inappropriately assigns a high risk as part of their cultural
association.190 Finally, the system 1 (fast thinking) can recall all of the anti-GMO
advertising and assigns a high risk to anything related to GMOs. Individualism is
problematic because society needs to come together to solve our food supply problems.
The risk from GMOs in the marketplace is the same as any other food.
These examples demonstrate that work needs to be done to recognize the rise of
individualism and provide information in a way that allows them to appropriately assign
risk. The rise of individualism does not negate any of the decision-making theories.
Instead, it demonstrates how societal externalities impact the position in which people
stand when they make decisions.
Risk communication strategies need to recognize the rise of hyper-individualism in

183. EPA, Notice of Pesticide Registration, C5 HoneySweet Plum, EPA (May 7, 2010),
https://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/ppls/011312-00008-20100507.pdf.
184. Ralph Scorza et al., Genetic engineering of Plum pox Virus resistance: ³HoneySweet´ plum±from
concept
to
product,
PLANT
CELL
TISS
ORGAN
CULT,
https://www.ars.usda.gov/ARSUserFiles/oc/br/plumpox/PCTOC2013.pdf (describing the history and problems
with the plum pox virus).
185. Cf. Brian Sparks, EPA Labels Honeysweet Plum as a Pesticide, GROWINGPRODUCE (June 1, 2010),
https://www.growingproduce.com/fruits/epa-labels-honeysweet-plum-as-a-pesticide/.
186. See Scorza et al., supra note 184.
187. Cf. Sparks, supra note 185 (³One of the most significant points CEI makes is that labeling HoneySweet
as a PIP could lead to consumer confusion.´).
188. ACSH Staff, Why GMO Labeling is Confusing, Misleading, and Ultimately Pointless, AM. COUNCIL ON
SCI. & HEALTH (July 27, 2015), https://www.acsh.org/news/2015/07/27/why-gmo-labeling-is-confusingmisleading-and-ultimately-pointless (quoting Dr. Hamblin: ³The central and debilitating fallacy of the right to
know argument is the meaningless and misleading nature of what is being known.´).
189. Cf. Peter M. Wiedermann & Holger Schutz, The Precautionary Principle and Risk Perception:
Experimental Studies in the EMF Area, 113 ENVNTL. HEALTH PERSP. 402, 402±05 (2005).
190. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 744.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss1/5

30

Sax: The Problems with Decision-Making

2020]

THE PROBLEMS WITH DECISION-MAKING

69

order to provide information in a way that allows people to appropriately assign risk. The
risk communication strategies described above are not necessarily sufficient. The rise of
individualism may, in some cases, be in tension with risk communication. People may
simply not believe the accurate information. This is discussed further in sub-section B
below.
B. Internet
The amount of information and mis-information on the internet poses an enormous
challenge. Actually, the depth of this issue is probably unknown.191 On the one hand, the
internet and access to a wide breadth of information is a positive development. On the
other hand, the availability of mis-information and a home for ³trolling´ the unwary is
problematic. If a person seeks to find information that supports their position, it is likely
available somewhere on the internet. This creates an enormous challenge for people to
easily and appropriately assign risk to various areas of biotechnology.
If a parent is hesitant to vaccinate their child, they can find homage on the
internet.192 So many people googled the link between autism and vaccines that Google
actively changed its algorithm for this search so that the Center for Disease Control¶s
(CDC) information came up first.193 The purpose for this change to the algorithm was to
bring up the correct scientific information, i.e., no link exists. But, this only addresses the
superficial problem. If a VHP wants to find support for their position, they can continue
to search the internet for misinformation that supports their position.
Once the mis-information is found on the internet, all of the decision-making
theories described within this article support the VHP¶s assessment of risk. If a VHP
searches the internet and finds information linking vaccines to autism, then the VHP may
assign a high risk to the vaccine based on ambiguity aversion.194 Furthermore, a VHP may
fear that they will actually harm their child with a vaccine, which suggests that affect is
also at play.195 Cultural cognition theory can also work in a way that leads a VHP to
inappropriately assign risk, depending on their group-grid position and the predicted

191. Michael K. Bergman, White Paper: The Deep Web: Surfacing Hidden Value, JOURNAL OF ELEC. PUBL¶G
(last visited Jan. 22, 2020), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jep/3336451.0007.104?view=text;rgn=main (describing
the deep web).
192. Vanessa Lam, Steven Teutsch & Jonathan Fielding, Refuting A Lie That Won¶t Die: Taking The Fight
For
Vaccines
Beyond
The
Doctor¶s
Office,
HEALTH
AFFAIRS
(Feb.
28,
2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190226.742851/full/.
193. George Johnson, The Widening World of Hand-Picked Truths, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/25/science/the-widening-world-of-hand-picked-truths.html?_r=0 (³Google
recently tweaked its algorithm so that searching for µvaccination¶ or µfluoridation¶, for example, brings vetted
medical information to the top of the results.´).
194. Cf. Blaisdell, supra note 8, at 483 tbl.2 (quoting VHP, ³I honestly haven¶t done a ton of research only
because I feel like you can find something to back up however you feel any time, so what is actually the right
and correct information? Because I¶ve been on those Facebook pages that are all about against vaccinations and
it scares you to death. . . .I feel like, where do you get the real information? You know?´).
195. Steve P. Calandrill, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out Of Vaccinating
Their Children?, 37 UNIV. MICH. J. LAW REFORM 353, 388±406 (2014) (describing the growing anti-vaccination
movement and stating: ³Further, some well-meaning parents systematically misperceive or overperceive the
magnitude of the risks involved, causing them to decide that the dangers of vaccinating are worse than the
benefits.´)
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assessment of risk.196 Finally, the availability of misinformation on the internet can
support the system 1 fast thinking in which a VHP will hesitate to vaccinate or not
vaccinate at all.197 The VHP would need to employ system 2 to override the fast thinking.
To complicate matters, it is unclear which, if any, of the decision-making processes is
dominant at any given time.
A similar scenario exists with food made from GMOs. In some ways, this is worse
than the issue with vaccines because society has not felt the long-term benefits of this
technology. An enormous amount of money (more on this below) is dedicated to the antiGMO movement.198 Internet searches about the safety of foods from GMOs brings up
mis-information about the possibility of a link to disease, such as cancer.199 From a
scientific assessment, the risk of foods from GMOs in the market place approaches zero.200
This is so for a number of reasons, including that the number of mutations introduced
through biotechnology are far less than those introduced through traditional techniques.
No additional risk is created through the technology.201
Not surprisingly, decision-making theories described herein explain why consumers
resist foods from GMOs. If a consumer receives competing information on the internet
about GMOs, then they will assign a high risk and low benefit pursuant to the theory of
ambiguity aversion.202 If affect is the driving decision-making theory, then the fear of
cancer or other potential diseases is sufficient for a consumer to assign a high risk. 203
Cultural cognition may also be at play if a person inappropriately assigns a high risk to
technology, even if that technology can help alleviate climate change.204 Finally, the
availability of mis-information about GMOs on the internet allows the system 1 fast
thinking to quickly assign a high risk to buying foods that contain GMOs. 205

196. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 744; cf. Smith, supra note 1, at 1±2 (describing the arguments against
vaccination).
197. Cf. Smith, supra note 1, at 2 (³Many of the µinfluencers¶ rely on the internet to spread their message
(together, the individuals and organizations included in Table 2 have more than 7 million Facebook followers,
although some overlap in followers may be expected). Recent work has demonstrated that approximately 80%
of individuals use the internet yearly to search for health information, and relatively few discuss these findings
with a healthcare professional.´).
198. Cf. AM. COUNCIL ON SCI. & HEALTH, About ACSH (last visited Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.acsh.org/about-acsh-0 (describing the mission and problem with anti-science groups).
199. Attempts to debunk this myth are also found. See e.g., L.Z.G. Touyz, Genetically Modified Foods,
Cancer, and Diet: Myths and Reality, 20 CURRENT ONCOLOGY e59, e60 (2013) (³The recent report claiming that
GMFs are causally associated with cancer development in rats has been debunked by informed opinion[.]´).
200. Strauss & Sax, supra note 103, at 476 (³Thus, the risk of unintended expression of endogenous toxic
proteins from genetic engineering is not greater than conventional breeding, and in most cases far less.´).
201. Marc Brazeau, GMOs: An Introduction, FAFDL (Sept. 3, 2014), http://fafdl.org/gmobb/gmos-anintroduction/ (³We¶ve done animal studies to look for potential unforeseen problems. None have been
discovered. In science, you start with manageable studies of rats and mice to see if that generates evidence of
something that justifies bigger, more expensive studies. But if there is no proof of concept, there is no interest
and no funding for further testing.´)
202. Sax & Doran (2019), supra note 6, at 56.
203. Lynas, supra note 78, at 140±44 (³µDid you know that GMOs can cause cancer and infertility?¶´).
204. This is an interesting part of cultural cognition. A person may be a communitarian-egalitarian on the
³group-grid´ and be concerned about the risks of climate change at the same time this group-grid designation
predicts that this person will assign a high risk to new technology. Kahan et al. (2008), supra note 30, at 88;
Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 744.
205. Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 19±25.
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The above is of course a cursory and summary assessment of how information from
the internet impacts the way people make decisions. This is a conceptual discussion
utilized to press the issue of how to allow people to appropriately assign risk in the face of
an enormous body of information and misinformation. Empirical studies are needed to
fully analyze the issue and, if possible, to determine how to counteract the applicability of
mis-information in decision-making.
C. Economics
High dollar amounts are invested to provide false or misleading information to
people.206 The anti-GMO movement, for example, is well funded. In Seeds of Science.
Mark Lynas describes how he got swept up in the anti-GMO movement.207 In his book,
Lynas describes how he spent years as an anti-GMO activist.208 It was not until he
researched the science behind climate change that he realized the benefits of genetically
engineered food for addressing malnutrition and sustainable agriculture. He had to grapple
with his years as an anti-GMO activist and come to terms with the harms caused by
Greenpeace and related organizations.209
Many of the anti-GMO organizations are non-profit organizations, such as
Greenpeace International, Friends of the Earth International, and the Center for Food
Safety.210 Interestingly, these non-profit companies and/or nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) promote themselves as the non-profit seeking and consumer
advocates fighting the big for-profit companies, such as Monsanto.211 In reality, these nonprofit and NGOs are well-funded and extremely effective at keeping GMOs out of the
market place²especially in areas that are in dire need of staple and stable crops, such as
poor areas in African countries.212 Most of the funding for these non-profits/NGOs is from
wealthy individuals in wealthy countries.213
The organic industry, which now cannot be described as anything other than Big
Agriculture, conducts strong anti-GMO campaigns.214 This is ironic given that the
206. See AM. COUNCIL ON SCI. & HEALTH, supra note 198.
207. Lynas, supra note 78, at 14±31 (describing his experience in the anti-GMO movement).
208. Id. at 11±31 (describing raids and other tactics to thwart producers and farmers of GMOs).
209. Id. at 33±49 (describing how climate change science opened his eyes so that he could accept the science
behind GMOs). The anti-GMO movement is not the only side with money. The manufacturers of seeds from
GMOs, such as Monsanto, are also well-funded. But, Monsanto does not appear to have sway with consumers in
the same way that Greenpeace is able to capitalize.
210. Robert Paarlberg, A Dubious Success: The NGO Campaign against GMOs, 5 GM CROPS & FOOD 223,
223 (2014) (³Much of this NGO opposition to GMOs has been led by European-based organizations such as
Greenpeace-International, and Friends of the Earth International, both headquartered in Amsterdam.´).
211. Id. (³Some of these organizations present themselves as advocates for social justice, some as advocates
for the rural poor, some as advocates for the environment, some as opponents of corporate-led globalization, and
some primarily as advocates for alternative farming methods, for example organic or agroecological methods,
which reject the use of GMOs.´).
212. Id. at 224.
213. Id. (³The single most powerful explanation for this continuing blockage of GMOs has been energetic
NGO campaigns of disinformation, led and financed mostly by individuals from well-fed countries who do not
need the technology themselves.´).
214. See, e.g., Organic Marketing Report, ACADS. REVIEW (last visited Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.hoards.com/sites/default/files/Academics-Review_Organic-Marketing-Report.pdf (describing the
organic industry) [hereinafter ACADS. REVIEW]; Michelle Miller, Farm Babe: The Fat Lies and Fatter Wallets
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technology might be highly beneficial for organic farmers.215 If, for example, an organic
farmer seeks to have a higher yield of crop, then a pest-resistant GMO crop allows them
to use less external pesticide and hopefully obtain a higher yield. But, for structural and
ideological reasons, the larger organic industry opposes crops from GMOs and strongly
campaigns against foods containing ingredients with GMOs.216
The anti-GMO movements incorporate, even exploit, the ways that people make
decisions such that consumers inappropriately assign a high risk to foods from GMOs. For
ambiguity aversion, the anti-GMO movement portrays that foods from GMOs may be
harmful or that we do not know enough about the crops to determine whether future harms
exist.217 For affect, the anti-GMO movement uses fear²fear of cancer and even fear of
homosexuality²to scare people into rejecting crops from GMOs.218 For cultural
cognition, even group minded individuals might decide to reject GMOs as risky, either
healthwise or from an environmental standpoint.219 For heuristics and dual process theory,
the availability of anti-GMO rhetoric and the labeling of food as GMO-free exploits the
system 1 thinking such that consumers easily recall an anti-GMO sentiment.220 System 2,
much harder to engage, is needed to access the evidence-based safety of foods from
GMOs.
The anti-vax movement is supported by money, but it has a deeper explanation,
which is a growing distrust of government and scientists. 221 In some ways, this is
understandable given mistakes made by governments about the mishandling of major
health consequences from drugs made by pharmaceutical companies; Vioxx being a recent
example.222 The anti-vaccine movement is able to exploit this. In addition, research in this
area suggests that the rise of individualism is contributing to vaccine hesitancy. 223 What
is clear is that few, if any, current public health strategies are effective in the face of the
increasing number of vaccine hesitant parents.224
Again, our understanding from decision-making theories demonstrates how the antivaccination movement is able to take hold. Money is spent by interest groups to promote
mis-leading information about the safety of vaccines. Applying ambiguity aversion,
of Anti-GMO Lobbyists, AG DAILY (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.agdaily.com/features/farm-babe-fat-lies-fatterwallets-anti-gmo-lobbyists/.
215. Amjad M. Husaini & Muhammed Sohail, Time to Redefine Organic Agriculture: Can¶t GM Crops Be
Certified as Organics?, 9 FRONTIERS PLANT SCI. 1, 3 (2018) (explaining how these new breeding techniques are
advantageous and promising for organic farmers).
216. ORGANIC TRADE ASS¶N, Organic and GMOs (last visited Jan. 22, 2020), https://ota.com/organic101/organic-and-gmos (³The use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is prohibited in organic products.´).
217. Id. (stating that ³Bt crops are engineered to produce toxins´). This demonstrates how the organic industry
uses language to confuse the issue. Organic farmers use external pesticides to kill insects. Bt crops are engineered
to resist a specific type of pest, without the need to external application of pesticide. Id.
218. Lynas, supra note 78, at 140 (³Another of the scientists spoke up, adding: µThey said that with this maize,
the next generation will have some sexual deformities, their children would have homosexual tendencies as a
result of eating this maize. It¶s really weird.¶´).
219. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 744; ACADS. REVIEW, supra note 214.
220. Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 19±25; cf. ACADS. REVIEW, supra note 214.
221. Eve Dube, Maryline Vivion & Noni E. MacDonald, Vaccine Hesitancy, Vaccine Refusal and the AntiVaccine Movement: Influence, Impact and Implications, 14 EXPERT REV. VACCINES 99, 109 (2015).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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parents receive information about a link between vaccines and autism or they receive
information about past harm from vaccines and they assign a high risk to vaccination.225
Fear of an adverse consequence from vaccines demonstrates that affect is at play for
VHPs.226 Even cultural cognition can explain how group-minded people can be against
vaccination due to their assessment/perception of risk.227 Finally, heuristics and dual
process theory help explain how the system 1 thinking in VHPs is at play because the
VHPs receive information from the internet promoting an anti-vaccine sentiment.228 The
VHP would need to employ system 2 thinking to assess the evidence-based assessment of
risk regarding current vaccines and the greater risk from the vaccine preventable disease.
D. Reconciliation and Transformation
The issues discussed in this article are difficult to address. This article does not seek
to upset or challenge any of the prevalent and evidence-based decision-making theories.
Instead, this article shows how changes in society make it even harder for people to make
decisions in which they appropriately assign risk. Current strategies to align consumer
perceptions of risk with evidence-based assessment of risk are largely unsuccessful.229
Providing correct facts to consumers (e.g., a doctor stating that vaccines are safe) is simply
insufficient given the complexity of decision-making and the forces seeking to utilize how
consumers make decisions to create the very chaos that this article seeks to address. 230
This article argues that the term ³transformation´ can be utilized to achieve risk
perception that is in line with evidence-based risk assessment. This term, transformation,
is also used in David Brooks¶ book, The Second Mountain, but in that book, he uses the
term as a way to find joy. This article takes a different bent on a similar concept, advocating
that transformation is an umbrella term, describing how change is needed for consumers
to accurately assign risk. As discussed above, additional research is needed to understand
how to provide information in a way that allows consumers to appropriately assign risk.
This needs to be done in a way that employs multiple decision-making theories and
considers the variables of the rise of individualism, the role of internet, and the economics
of forces seeking to create confusion and chaos.
The problem addressed in this article is a tough one to solve. This article suggests
that the answer lies in the decision-making theories. The anti-vaccination movement and
the anti-GMO movement effectively use techniques that drive at the heart of these
decision-making theories to obtain their desired results. One response is to use the
decision-making theories to undo the anti-science sentiment²this is controversial, to be
sure. Simply providing fact sheets from the CDC about the safety of vaccines is completely
insufficient.231 Instead, the information can be provided in a way that diminishes
225. See, e.g., Blaisdell et al., supra note 8, at 483, 485±87.
226. Sax (2017), supra note 12, at 447.
227. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 744; see Smith, supra note 1, at 1±2.
228. Myths about vaccines linger. See, e.g., PUB. HEALTH, Vaccine Myths Debunked (last visited Jan. 22,
2020), https://www.publichealth.org/public-awareness/understanding-vaccines/vaccine-myths-debunked/.
229. Dube et al., supra note 221, at 110.
230. See Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 753±57.
231. This is a major take-away message of cultural cognition. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 755±57.
According to Kahan, the information has to be presented in a way that conforms to the group-grid ideology,
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ambiguity, captures emotion, acknowledges cultural cognition as risk perception, and
allows consumers to easily and readily recall information that allows them to appropriately
assign risk.
Promoting evidence-based assessment of risk in a way that allows people to
appropriately assign risk does have externalities. For example, as mentioned above,
Google changed its algorithm such that searches for vaccines and autism brought up the
CDC¶s fact sheets at the top of the search. Having Google change algorithms has major
externalities in that it can be quite risky to have a private company control what
information people receive.
The issue is how to allow people to make decisions based on an appropriate
assignment of risk even in the face of numerous variables seeking to persuade people to
inappropriately assign risk. The solution, referred to as Transformation, must include a
combination of decision-making theories, risk communication strategies that contemplate
how people make decisions, and combatting the variables of hyper-individualism, internet,
and economics as they impact assessment of risk. This is a lofty goal, to be sure. To be
clear, allowing people to appropriately assign risk is distinct from their ultimate choice. In
other words, a person may understand that foods from GMOs are as safe as conventional
foods but still choose not to eat foods from GMOs for other reasons. The idea in this article
is simply to align consumer perception of risk with evidence-based assessment of risk, but
not to take away the autonomy of the final choice.
This article seeks to recognize the complexity of current society and discuss how
that complexity impacts decisions regarding risk assessment. In this way, this article raises
the need for additional studies that address changes in society as a variable for risk
communication and policy implementation methods. How does one, for example, allow a
VHP to appropriately assign risk when the VHP is convinced that their online source of
information is correct? Recent mandatory vaccination laws have increased the number of
vaccinated children, so from a public health perspective, these laws work. But, it does not
necessarily provide the VHP with the ability to appropriately assign risk. Mandatory
compliance laws will not work with all areas of biotechnology. A state legislature will not,
for example, require people to eat food from GMOs. Thus, the bigger question is how to
allow people to appropriately assign risk in an increasingly complex society where people
obtain information from various sources, not all of which are accurate.
In his book, Thinking Fast and Slow, Kahneman recognizes the value of Cass
Sunstein¶s work on nudges. According to Kahneman, nudges assist with the system 1
decisions. For example, if employees are automatically enrolled in a retirement savings
plan, then they are nudged into savings. The system 1, or quick thinking, is more likely to
go along with the automatic enrollment. System 2 is needed to opt-out because the person
would need to slow down and think about both short-term and long-term budgets.
Conversely, an opt-in policy for retirement savings is less likely to accomplish the societal
goal of saving for retirement. No nudge is created. System 1 may quickly reject an opt-in
because it means that the person will receive less per paycheck. In sum, nudging is an
effective way to overcome a system 1 process that may lead to an undesirable result.

otherwise, the person will reject it.
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But, it is unclear if nudging is sufficient or desirable to overcome the externalities
of hyper-individualism and the internet, especially with respect to emerging technologies.
Not enough people believe in climate change, for example. As Neil deGrasse Tyson
famously stated: ³The good thing about science is that it¶s true whether or not you believe
in it.´232 Climate change is real, whether one believes it or not. Changing our behaviors to
address climate change is critical. Agriculture, one focus of this paper, is part of the
solution. If people reject GMOs, for example, then our agriculture system will continue to
be a major contributing source to climate change. While nudging can be used in some
areas, it cannot save us from climate change. It is doubtful that even Cass Sunstein would
argue with this assertion.
This begs the question of how to allow people to appropriately assign risk to
technology, such as GMOs, even in the face of non-evidence-based opposition. Simply
providing the facts is insufficient to allow people to appropriately assign risk. 233 If we
want to allow people to appropriately assign risk as part of their decision-making, then we
need to understand how the rise of individualism, the role of the internet, and the
economics of keeping people from appropriately assigning risk interacts with decisionmaking. Of course, allowing people to appropriately assign risk is a normative approach²
but it seems the most honest approach. It does not require any particular decision; it simply
allows the person to have an assessment of risk in line with evidence-based risk
assessment.
As previously indicated, this is a hard problem to solve. One suggestion is to utilize
the decision-making theories to promote information to consumers in a way that exposes
how the anti-vaxxers and anti-GMOers have used these decision-making theories to
manipulate consumers. That is, show how the anti-movements use ambiguity, affect,
cultural cognition, and prospect theory to advance their position. Expose these groups for
what they are actually doing. This can be accomplished through the risk communication
tools discussed in this article: nudging, risk hybrid, and public participation.
The risk communication and perception strategies such as nudging, risk hybrid, and
public participation in controversial areas can be effectively utilized to provide
information in a way that exposes how some private interest groups are manipulating the
consumers. The obvious opposition to the above suggestion is that it is manipulative. The
argument is that the government or public health agencies should simply provide the facts
in a neutral way and allow the consumer to decide. By utilizing the techniques of the antivaccination movement or the anti-GMO movement, we are sinking down to their level and
manipulating people into making decisions. This argument has merit, to be sure, because
it is a form of manipulation. But, by not addressing how the opponents have gained so
much momentum in a way that actually pushes back, the harms will continue. One way to
address this argument is to be transparent. Actually, all of the risk communication
strategies discussed in this article seek transparency.
Empirical studies that include the variables described herein are needed to
understand how to align consumer perception of risk with evidence-based assessment of
232. Neil deGrasse Tyson, Quotable Quote, GOOD READS (last visited Jan. 22,
https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/340727-the-good-thing-about-science-is-that-it-s-true-whether.
233. See Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 753±57.
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risk. Decision-making theories, risk communication, and external factors (individualism,
internet, and economics) need to be combined in mega-study. This necessarily draws on
important work accomplished by many cited within this article and seeks to move the ball
forward incrementally, which is the scientific way. Grafted within this suggestion is the
concept of communicating information in a way that complies with how people make
decisions, as suggested by Daniel Kahan in his work on cultural cognition.
The normative framework discussed in this article seeks to include changes in
society and how we receive information as an integral variable in studies that seek to
implement policies grounded in evidence-based assessment of risk. By building on
important work in the social sciences, economics, and legal literature, this article moves
the discussion forward. The concept is not to state that any decision-making theory or
policy implementation tool is better than the other; rather, it is to use the important work
done by others to test what is the most effective method given our modern-day
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Our society faces tough problems. Sustainable agriculture and advances in
healthcare are major topics. The resistance to some of the emerging technologies in these
areas warrants serious evaluation, which is what this article seeks to highlight. In numerous
areas, consumers are assigning a high risk to technology even though experts assign an
evidence-based assessment of low risk.
This article describes several decision-making theories that help us to understand
how people assign risk. In addition, different risk communication and policy
implementation strategies are explored. By using two controversial examples, vaccines
and GMOs, this article explains why consumers resist these technologies, along with the
harms of such resistance. But, this article does not stop there. This article presses the
conversation forward by highlighting how changes in society are important variables in
understanding how consumers assign risk. The rise of hyper-individualism, information
on the internet, and the economics of marketing are all important variables that require
specific exploration to help us understand consumer perceptions of risk.
The next phase of research needs to consider the changes in society to augment our
understanding of decision-making and consumer perceptions of risk. Furthermore, these
variables need to be considered in risk communication and policy implementation
strategies. The world is changing and evolving. The problems are increasing. Societies
need to collaborate and seek technological solutions to solve our most pressing problems.
Policymakers need consumers to be in a position to appropriately assign risk in order to
allow governments and citizens to work together to solve issues such as climate change
and healthcare.
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